

JOURNAL OF ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS HISTORY | V11 / N1

Veritas



This 'spectrum' issue of *Veritas* ranges from World War II to current operations. A second generation professional soldier shared his father's WWII papers. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Theodore C. Mataxis, an infantry battalion commander during and after the war, became bored with occupation duty. He volunteered for assignment with an American-led Allied history element interviewing senior and key German POWs. SS Major (MAJ) Otto Skorzeny, Hitler's 'Commando Extraordinary,' was among them. An original copy of his interview on the glider-borne rescue of *Il Duce* Benito Mussolini was the catalyst for this effort. OSS Special Operations (SO) and Operational Group (OG) Branches are the subject of another article. Post D-Day successes in Europe prompted the OSS to scramble to get bilingual operatives into the war. The results were mixed.

Two Korean War-era articles conclude the history of the mobilized U.S. Army Reserve 301st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet (RB&L) Group in Germany and its successor, the 7721st RB&L Group. The PSYOP (1994-1995) and CA (2010) articles center on Haiti. SOCSOUTH staff and JTF SWORD (CE) 'joined at the hip' in Port-au-Prince in 2010, to demonstrate their seamless command and control (C&C) integration during SOF deployments.

At Fort Bragg, the ARSOF Medal of Honor display 'premiered' on 16 December 2014. The centerpiece was the headquarters exhibit honoring the only ARSOF soldier to receive the Medal of Honor (MOH) in WWII. Cavalry First Lieutenant Jack L. Knight, MARS Task Force, was posthumously awarded the MOH for fearlessly leading his troop's attack on 2 February 1945 against entrenched Japanese forces guarding the Burma Road. His youngest brother, Bill, spoke at the opening. On 10 March 2015, Vietnam MOH recipient, Colonel Roger H. Donlon, assisted the CG, USASOC in opening the ARSOF MOH Display for the 3rd SFG Dining Facility. The U.S. Congress honored WWII First Special Service Force veterans (SF direct lineage unit) with its Gold Medal on 2 February 2015 in Washington.

New publications include an *OSS Primer* that is presented to graduating SFQC, CA, and PSYOP officers, and SF warrant officers, and the *PSYOP History Handbook*, printed by the 3rd PSYOP Battalion. This handbook is the standard for more ARSOF functional histories. Unit Lessons Learned personnel are now charged with producing concise, single page Operational Analyses and collecting historical documents. They will distribute *Veritas* and the forthcoming GWOT memorial, *The Last Full Measure of Devotion*. Thanks for the support. CHB



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
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Front Cover: Soldiers assigned to the multinational BARDSEA Project line up at mealtime at Erlestoke, England in 1944. BARDSEA, made up of Polish, English, and American personnel, had the mission of working with Polish expatriates living in German-occupied France.



CAT 812

in Haiti

Rescue in Jérémie

by Troy J. Sacquety

**In keeping with USSOCOM Policy, Special Operations Soldiers Major and below and the operational objectives in this article have been given pseudonyms.*

Two months after the catastrophic magnitude 7.0 earthquake on 12 January 2010, members of Civil Affairs Team (CAT) 812 rushed to get a 3-month old girl with a serious infection in her shoulder to the hospital at Jérémie, Haiti. A very frightened mother who could not speak English clutched the child closely. She had nervously climbed into a truck filled with strangers in order to save her child. “She was in life-threatening condition. We had to get her to a hospital as soon as possible—it could not wait,” said Staff Sergeant (SSG) Dave Ost*, the team medic.¹ It took more than an hour of driving over dusty, rutted gravel roads to get to the hospital. The situation highlighted Haiti’s lack of easily accessible medical care and why CA became such a critical Humanitarian Assistance (HA) element in the wake of the 2010 earthquake.

This article details the accomplishments of CAT 812 in Haiti after the devastating earthquake.² Although a small part of the overall ARSOF response to the disaster, CAT 812 demonstrated what CA can bring to the table. In short, because of its focus to act as an intermediary between the U.S. military and civilian populations, CA demonstrated its position as the ARSOF branch most needed for the HA mission in Haiti. It was the element best able to establish goodwill towards the U.S. relief effort in the local Haitian communities.

In the late afternoon of 12 January 2010, a strong earthquake centered about 15 miles to the west of the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince, caught the country unaware and caused massive destruction.³ Prior to the earthquake, Haiti was already a desperately poor failed state with dire needs. Because it has no construction standards, many structures collapsed in Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas. While the exact figure is unknown, the death toll estimates ranged from 100,000 to more than 316,000 killed.⁴ The devastation did not stop there.

The earthquake left many survivors homeless. And, due to the numerous aftershocks, many refused to go back inside their houses. These refugees, termed Internally Displaced People (IDP), set up camps on open ground or fled to stay with relatives in outlying areas untouched by the earthquake. The United Nations (UN) and numerous

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were already on the ground before the earthquake. But they too suffered losses and were unprepared for the totality of the destruction. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was already on the ground but nearly a hundred UN peacekeepers were killed in the earthquake, including the civilian head of mission. It could not handle the disaster by itself. Fortunately, the world responded immediately to the ensuing humanitarian crisis.

International aid and money poured in to assist Haiti in its plight, particularly from NGOs and religious groups. Medical and search and rescue teams arrived to pull victims from the rubble. The UN increased its peacekeeper levels in the country, while other countries pledged money and manpower. However, the U.S. provided the largest troop contribution.⁵

Dubbed Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, Army Lieutenant General (LTG) P. K. ‘Ken’ Keen, deputy commander of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), led the U.S. military humanitarian mission.⁶ In a fortuitous twist, LTG Keen happened to be in Haiti on an official visit during the earthquake. He witnessed the catastrophe firsthand. His personal friendships in Haiti before the disaster made him an ideal candidate for the mission. In addition, he had a long-term bond with Brazilian Major General Floriano Peixoto, who commanded the MINUSTAH forces. This friendship dated to a 1984 exchange program then Captain (CPT) Keen had participated in with the Brazilian Airborne Brigade.⁷ USSOUTHCOM directed LTG Keen to organize Joint Task Force–Haiti (JTF-Haiti) for Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. JTF-Haiti in turn, worked with the UN MINUSTAH military forces.

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE involved more than 22,000 U.S. personnel from all services.⁸ After the Government of Haiti requested American assistance through the U.S. Ambassador, Washington agreed to provide peacekeeping forces to assist Haiti with Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR). As the responsible theater command for Haiti, the Commander, USSOUTHCOM, issued the tasking order for forces.⁹ Although facing difficulties in deploying so rapidly, personnel from all the military branches arrived to help Haiti during the crisis.

The U.S. Navy deployed a number of ships, ranging from an aircraft carrier to a rescue and salvage ship, several combat vessels, and a hospital ship to provide shore support


Numerous nations pledged assistance to Haiti in the wake of the earthquake. Japan offered this C-130, sitting on the airfield at Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida, along with a Disaster Relief Team.



Already a city with dire needs, the 12 January 2010 earthquake devastated Port-au-Prince. As was a common scene throughout the city in the days after, survivors frantically looked for trapped victims in the rubble.




Port-au-Prince is a densely populated city. In front is one of the many IDP camps. In the hills behind are shanty houses which lay almost on top of one another. Makeshift construction methods raised the earthquake's death toll.



For many days after the earthquake, the dead lay on the sidewalks of Port-au-Prince until they could be collected by authorities.



Joint Task Force-Haiti Organizational Structure



LTG P. K. 'Ken' Keen

and medical facilities. The U.S. Coast Guard contributed several vessels including two cutters. The largest ground contingents were the 2,000-man U.S. Marine Corps 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Special Operations Capable) (SOC) and 3,000 soldiers from the U.S. Army XVIII Airborne Corps (primarily the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division). Marines from the 24th MEU (SOC) also participated. These elements provided stability forces, conducted emergency search and rescue, distributed aid, and evacuated U.S. citizens.¹⁰ Special Operations Forces (SOF) also responded to the crisis by providing rapid-reaction elements.

Within days, Special Operations Command-South (SOCSOUTH) sent in a team to control SOF assets in country. It formed the core of Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command-Forward (JFSOCC-FWD). The SOCSOUTH J-3, Army Colonel (COL) Daniel Stoltz, commanded JFSOCC-FWD. Its mission was to conduct "special operations; to include area assessments and civil recon, information operations, air traffic control and aerial port operations; in order to facilitate [Humanitarian Assistance/Direct Relief] efforts and mitigate trends of mass migration and destabilization in support of JTF-Haiti."¹¹

JFSOCC-FWD established its headquarters in the *Quisqueya* Christian School in Port-au-Prince. Then, USSOCOM sent in JTF-SWORD (Core Element) to augment the newly established JFSOCC-FWD. Its commander, Army COL Barrett F. Lowe, became the JFSOCC-FWD deputy commander.¹² For USASOC, all of its functional branches/elements responded to the crisis to some degree except the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and the 75th Ranger Regiment.

While conventional forces took over the disaster relief mission in Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas,

JFSOCC-FWD covered the rest of the country. In so doing, it provided 'economy of force,' because less than 100 personnel handled this enormous assignment.¹³ Its primary task was to conduct assessments of the available medical facilities and determine critical needs outside of Port-au-Prince and then arrange aid to meet those gaps. Because so many survivors had left the capital earthquake area to stay with relatives in the countryside, their arrival stressed locations already plagued by limited infrastructure and resources.

Civil Affairs personnel were among the first ARSOF elements to respond. Eventually two companies of the 98th CA Battalion deployed to Haiti for Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. CAT 812, from Company A, arrived first. It was the closest ARSOF CA element in the Caribbean, being the Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) deployed to Trinidad and Tobago. Because SOCSOUTH already had the CMSE under their operational control, it was easy for them to redirect it to Haiti.¹⁴

Five soldiers composed CAT 812. CPT Vick Cider*, originally from Montana, commanded the team.¹⁵ Its Noncommissioned-Officer-In-Charge (NCOIC) was Sergeant First Class (SFC) Alejandro Sands* from Ohio.¹⁶ Texan SFC Sherry Michaels*, formerly a supply sergeant, was the CA NCO on CAT 812.¹⁷ SSG Joaquim Gasperich*, originally from Colombia, served as the team CA planner.¹⁸ Finally, SSG Dave Ost was the medic in CAT 812. Originally from Illinois, Ost had served in the

The United States and *Haiti*

Located in the Caribbean on the western third of the island of Hispaniola, Haiti is equivalent in size to Maryland.¹ Its population of 10 million is near that of its neighbor to the east, the Dominican Republic.² In the colonial era, Haiti was a profitable French possession based on slave labor. The slave population successfully revolted and declared independence in 1804. From there, Haiti's fortunes declined and it is now the most impoverished nation in the Western Hemisphere. According to estimates, 80% of the population lives in poverty, 54% are in abject poverty, and more than 50% are illiterate.³

Haiti's misery is compounded by constant political upheaval and decades of mismanagement that left the country dependent on foreign aid. By the early 20th Century, a series of revolts and poor leadership left the country "sunk in political ineptitude. Between 1911 and 1915 the presidency of Haiti was occupied by a bewildering series of statesmen, several of whom met personal misfortune in office," according to historian Robert H. Ferrell.⁴ This forced the U.S. into a long history of involvement in Haiti.

U.S. Marines occupied Haiti in 1915 in the wake of extreme instability following the mob execution of President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam.⁵ The Marine Corps remained stationed in the country until 1934 and the U.S. retained control of Haiti's economy until 1941.⁶ The subsequent decades were marked by instability and numerous Haitian dictators, eventually leading to more U.S. involvement.

Sixty years later the U.S. launched Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY as a result of the 30 September 1991 overthrow of Haiti's first elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide by Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras. The crisis spurred a flood of refugees who tried to reach the U.S. in unseaworthy craft.⁷ The U.S. intervened politically to get a reluctant Cédras to agree to a peaceful transfer of power back to Aristide. On 11 October 1993, U.S. and Canadian forces on board the USS Harlan County (LST-1196) tried to enter Haiti. Despite an agreement with Cédras, a mob met them at the dock. Since the Battle of Mogadishu had only occurred a week prior, the ship returned to the U.S. rather than risk another engagement.⁸

The setback prompted the U.S. to ready an invasion force. Forces were already en route when a last minute deal with Cédras brokered by former President James E. 'Jimmy' Carter, Senator Sam A. Nunn, and retired General Colin Powell prevented bloodshed.⁹ The ground operation lasted from 19 Sept 1994 to 31 March 1995 and included elements of the U.S. Army Rangers,



3rd SFG, the 2nd and 4th Psychological Operations Groups, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, and the 351st Civil Affairs Command.¹⁰ UPHOLD DEMOCRACY succeeded in finalizing the transfer of power back to Aristide.

Peace lasted until 2004, when the U.S. again had to intervene in Haiti. This time, it was to help Aristide flee the country. After being successfully reelected in 2000 (he was out of office from 1996-2001), Aristide's opponents revolted. Beginning in February 2004, they seized several cities in northern Haiti and threatened Port-au-Prince. Haitian refugees again took to boats to flee to the United States in order to escape the chaos. This forced American involvement.

The U.S. flew Aristide to exile on 29 February 2004 to the Central African Republic.¹¹ Then, soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment arrived in Haiti to help lead a multinational interim force. The Marines left several months later following the restoration of stability. The remaining international forces constituted the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), established on 1 June 2004 by Security Council Resolution 1542.¹² It was this force that was already on the ground when the 12 January 2010 earthquake struck. In addition, more than 10,000 non-government organizations (NGOs), such as The Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders, were working in the aid sector.¹³ Haiti was already a country greatly in need prior to that devastating natural disaster.¹⁴



Air traffic controllers at the Toussaint L'Ouverture International Airport were overwhelmed by the sheer volume of aid flights until U.S. Air Force Special Tactics Squadron Air Traffic Controllers rapidly restored order and functionality. From a card-table and using hand-held radios, they handled 250 aircraft a day up from the 30 that might use that airport on a normal day.



JFSOCC-FWD headquarters was located at the Quisqueya Christian School in Port-au-Prince. Its buildings had been unaffected by the earthquake and its walls provided needed security.



Haiti was in chaos when CAT 812 arrived. Many of the injured had to lie outside local medical facilities, such as this one, because they were full.

Joint Task Force

USASOC established Joint Task Force Sword (Core Element) [JTF SWORD (CE)] at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to provide a deployable, capable and robust special operations command and control (C2) element.¹ Despite being a USSOCOM asset, the unit remained stationed at Fort Bragg and was jointly administered by USASOC and USSOCOM.² Commanded by a Colonel, JTF SWORD (CE) had thirty-one personnel billets. USASOC assigned twenty-four Army special operations personnel. The rest of the unmanned billets were for one civilian administrative assistant, two Air Force, two U.S. Marine Corps, and two U.S. Navy special operations personnel.

Its mission statement was, “when directed, Joint Task Force Sword deploys and establishes a SOF C2 element, or integrates with a forming or formed SOF HQ to rapidly establish a special operations JTF/JSOTF HQ, providing command and control for the conduct of full spectrum special operations worldwide.”³ As such, JTF SWORD (CE) could deploy in four packages depending on the skills and the level of effort required.

JTF SWORD (CE) conducted several deployments in its brief existence. From 2008 through 2011, JTF SWORD (CE) deployed a number of planning teams (Level II) in support of Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) and Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A). It executed a Level IIIA deployment to Firebase Torkham in Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM from December 2008 to August 2009.

JTF SWORD (CE) executed a Level IIIB deployment in support of Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) to Haiti for Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE from January to March 2010. There, personnel from SOCSOUTH and JTF SWORD (CE) formed the Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command-Forward (JFSOCC-FWD). The Director of JTF SWORD served as the Deputy Commander for the JFSOCC-FWD and the SOCSOUTH J-3 served as the Commander. JTF SWORD (CE) was disbanded in 2013 to provide personnel to support the stand-up of Special Operations Joint Task Force-Bragg (SOJTF-B).⁴

SKILL/LEVEL DEPLOYMENT PACKAGES

- **Level I:** individuals from JTF SWORD (CE) supported a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) or other organization with specific skill sets.
- **Level II:** a planning team comprised of 4-8 personnel.
- **Level IIIA:** was the employment of JTF SWORD (CE) as a stand-alone Command and Control element. That could include a small augmentation from across SOCOM.
- **Level IIIB:** was the employment of JTF SWORD (CE) in total to augment a TSOC (or other organization) to establish a more robust C2 headquarters.


1st Ranger Battalion during the first Gulf War. He had spent several years as a civilian Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), only to rejoin the Army after 11 September 2001.¹⁹

CAT 812 arrived in Haiti within twelve hours of the earthquake. The CA team deployed along with a Military

Information Support Team (MIST) from Trinidad and Tobago. Because it had been deployed to another mission, CAT 812 needed additional equipment and supplies to fulfill the new assignment. SSG Gasperich explained that due to the nature of the Trinidad and Tobago duties, the team routinely wore civilian clothes, “I had a suitcase of civilian clothes, but only one set of ACUs!”²⁰ SSG Ost added, “I had one uniform and one set of socks and a T-shirt in Trinidad.”²¹ The situation was no less chaotic on the ground.


“When the plane door opened it was crazy. Planes were all over the place and people everywhere. Lots of supplies were still in planes or stacked outside,” stated SSG Gasperich.²² SFC Sands added, “It was total chaos!”²³ The first priority involved finding a place to serve as a base of operations.

CAT 812 initially set up in an auto garage owned by the Haitian father of an ARSOF soldier who had arrived earlier with a small advanced team from SOCSOUTH. That first night, the CA team realized how unstable the situation was when aftershocks continued to rock the area. “We thought the building might come down. It was crazy! We tried to move outside, but the mosquitos were eating us alive, so we moved back inside,” said SFC



Owned by the father of an ARSOF soldier, this garage served as the initial receiving center for U.S. Special Operations Forces, including CAT 812, in Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE.

Core Element



Michaels.²⁴ Weeks later, SSG Gasperich recalled that night, “We were all thinking about aftershocks.”²⁵

The next day, the members of CAT 812 had a chance to evaluate the situation. SSG Gasperich described the scene, “We were shocked at the destruction . . . Bodies were on top of each other in the streets. The smell was horrible.”²⁶ SSG Ost had the unenviable task of surveying medical facilities. “The local hospital was a small slice of hell. There was large scale structural damage and the morgue was overflowing . . . there were so many distraught relatives that it was chaos.”²⁷

CAT 812 soon realized that there were many individual groups trying to offer aid but that no single entity provided overall coordination and direction. To fulfill that requirement, the CA team formed a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) in the U.S. Embassy.²⁸ The HACC managed and directed all the incoming aid, including deconflicting with the UN. SOCSOUTH commander, Brigadier General Hector E. Pagan, later commented that “the HACC became one of those elements that everybody concluded . . . that it is a must for any other [Humanitarian Assistance] operation in the future.”²⁹ The HACC first took a simple but highly effective step.

“We set up an email account that we passed out to all we talked to,” explained SSG Michaels.³⁰ SSG Gasperich said that they gave the email “to people to coordinate food requests . . . news of the email got out fast. We got 300-400 emails a day.”³¹ In addition, CPT Cider met several times daily with





As more U.S. government and NGO aid teams arrived in Haiti, they based themselves at the U.S. Embassy. Newcomers had to sleep in tents on the grounds of the greatly overcrowded Embassy.



One unexpected duty for the Civil Affairs medics at the U.S. Embassy was helping to deliver a baby.



PFC Anastasia Anse, on the right, interprets as SSG Dave Ost, left, attends to a Haitian man with a severe arm wound.

UN elements and NGOs. Although better than the garage, living in the U.S. Embassy compound had its drawbacks.

Overcrowding was the most difficult aspect. It seemed that every non-governmental U.S.-based aid group sought sanctuary on the Embassy grounds because of the security and comforts that it offered. More tried to get in daily. This overtaxed the facilities, forcing long lines to use the bathroom or to take a shower. However, the secondary impact as SFC Sands recalled, manifested itself in the “500 people sleeping in tents on the Embassy grounds.”³² CAT 812 had to sleep inside their Embassy work space.

SFC Michaels recalled that “we pulled out sleeping bags and slept right there.”³³ “We had a group of six trying to sleep in a cubicle that was designed for one guy,” added SFC Sands.³⁴ Fortunately, the situation was temporary for the entire team. Because they were a valuable asset with a lot of territory to cover, JFSOCC-FWD directed the CA team to split up.

While the rest of the team handled the HACC, CPT Cider and SSG Ost were sent to northern Haiti to assess the situation. They were followed several days later by the rest of CAT 812 as newly-arrived CA personnel from the 98th Civil Affairs Battalion took over their duties at the HACC. For several weeks, CAT 812 estimated the number of IDPs, supplies required, and assessed the capabilities of the medical infrastructure to accommodate the new arrivals.³⁵ After reporting that information back to the JFSOCC-FWD, they then coordinated aid for those areas and provided for the medical facilities most in need. With northern Haiti assessed and SOF responding, JFSOCC-FWD ordered CAT 812 to the city of Jérémie in western Haiti to continue the process.

To facilitate its mission, CAT 812 gained an interpreter. Private First Class (PFC) Anastasia Anse*, a soldier in the 528th Sustainment Brigade, Special Troops Battalion, at Fort Bragg, NC, explained that USASOC had placed a call for Haitian Creole speakers to all its units. Because of her Haitian mother, Anse spoke Haitian Creole (as well as French and Spanish) and had lived there as a child. She volunteered.³⁶

Working with CAT 812 was not PFC Anse’s first job in Haiti during this operation. She had previously served as a translator to 7th Special Forces Group soldiers assessing conditions in northern Haiti. During that assignment, PFC Anse learned that she could be a far more effective interpreter if she wore civilian clothes. Not only did it help communication, but “it does not draw as much attention.”³⁷ She continued that practice with CAT 812. With the team complete, CAT 812 packed into two rented four-wheel-drive vehicles to make the 180-mile trek to Jérémie.

The lack of a serviceable road network from Port-au-Prince to Jérémie made the trip arduous. What would have been a three-hour journey in the United States became a twelve hour expedition in Haiti. CPT Cider recalled, “The mountain passes were . . . unimproved roads of rock and mud. A heavy rainfall two days before did not help.”³⁸ SSG Gasperich added, “It was definitely an adventure!”³⁹ During the trip, CAT 812 had to ford several rivers. SSG Ost recalled that “CPT Cider and I had to walk to the middle of [one] river




A scene from the trip to Jérémie from Port-au-Prince demonstrates the rugged terrain. Typical for Haiti, the hills have been logged bare to make charcoal, denuding the countryside.



CAT 812 wore full kit when it arrived in Haiti, as does SSG Gasperich. Those orders changed when JFSOCC-FWD determined that there was no threat to the humanitarian mission.



CPT Cider evaluates a river crossing site. He and SSG Dave Ost ended up wading into the water to determine its suitability for fording vehicles.



One of the numerous orphanages CAT 812 visited in and around Jérémie. CPT Cider (left) stands with SFC Michaels (right).



An Army Landing Craft Utility (LCU), similar to the one employed by the 97th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) to bring supplies to Jérémie. CAT 812 determined that the city was in great need of basic supplies and arranged for the delivery.

to test if the vehicles could get across.”⁴⁰ CAT 812 arrived in Jérémie tired and dusty. Only late that first night did they finally find a local hotel to serve as a base of operations.

Jérémie, a city of about 31,000, is the largest in the area. It is the birthplace of the father of the famous French author, Alexandre Dumas, who wrote *The Three Musketeers* and *The Count of Monte Cristo*. Like many urban cities in Haiti, Jérémie had a large UN presence. When CAT 812 arrived, a Uruguayan armored unit serving as the UN contingent, greeted them. SSG Gasperich’s Colombian background proved very valuable in building rapport with the Uruguayan soldiers.⁴¹ The team began to assess the HA needs in Jérémie.

CPT Cider recalled, “Our mission was to facilitate Humanitarian Assistance and find out what were the critical needs.”⁴² In order to do this, CAT 812 had to accomplish several tasks. First, the team had to assess the number of IDPs. They estimated that there were some 100,000 in Jérémie and the surrounding areas. This meant the locality did not have enough food—already in short supply long before the earthquake—to go around. In addition, Jérémie’s very limited health care system could not meet the needs of its residents, much less the influx of tens of thousands of new arrivals.⁴³ Second, CAT 812 assessed the large number of outlying orphanages. They discovered that villagers in the outlying areas had little health care and less food than those in Jérémie. Assessing the orphanages enabled CAT 812 to accomplish its third task: meet the local NGOs. One in particular, the Haitian Health Fund (HHF), became one of their key partners in Jérémie.

CAT 812 then arranged to restore the regular delivery of staples. CPT Cider explained, “A boat [normally brought] in ninety percent of [their] food and fuel . . . after the earthquake the boat [only carried] people.” With a couple of phone calls, CPT Cider arranged for an Army Landing Craft, Utility (LCU) to deliver 29,000 pounds of food and fuel to Jérémie. “It was a giant boat with a large U.S. flag flying. It drew a lot of attention,” remarked CPT Cider. The Uruguayan



Kwashiorkor, a disease caused by protein deficiency, is prevalent in western Haiti. This child in the Jérémie HHF clinic in Jérémie had a slim chance of survival.



CPT Vick Cider holds a child at the Haitian Health Fund ‘Center of Hope’ facility in Jérémie. HHF is one of the largest NGOs in western Haiti.



The HHF administered immunizations and maintained detailed health records on local infants and children.

UN contingent handled security and arranged trucks to transport the food to a warehouse for distribution.⁴⁴

The delivery had quite an impact from the start. With the arrival of the LCU, Dr. Bette Gebrian-Magloire from the HHF led the singing of *The Star Spangled Banner*. The next day, the team met with the local NGOs to come up with a plan to distribute the food equitably. CPT Cider explained, "The HHF was ecstatic because they were able to feed 4,300 people. It definitely enhanced our reputation with them." But there were other changes for the better as well. "It was the first time in a month and a half that the town had streetlights," said CPT Cider, because the town's generator had no fuel.⁴⁵

With Jérémie's immediate needs met, CAT 812 expanded assistance to the surrounding areas. The HHF requested that CAT 812 help at a basic medical clinic in a remote village several hours outside of Jérémie. The CA team decided that conducting a Medical Civic Action Program



The HHF/CAT 812 MEDCAP was held in a communal cinderblock building outside of Jérémie. The building provided a secure and convenient meeting place where patients could sit comfortably in the shade while they waited to receive health care.



The HHF staff introduced CAT 812 before the MEDCAP to make the villagers comfortable.



This patient being examined by SSG Dave Ost had tuberculosis. Diseases that are rare in the rest of the Western World are still prevalent in Haiti.



A mother (left) holding a very sick child is comforted by PFC Anastasia Anse (right).

(MEDCAP) mission with the HHF would allow them to assess the needs in the outlying villages. Because the HHF provided medical personnel and the guide, only a portion of CAT 812 (the commander, medic, and interpreter) supported the mission.⁴⁶ The group set out early in the morning to travel because of the unimproved dirt roads.

The two vehicle ‘convoy’ arrived at the village with everyone covered in dust. The villagers had been alerted of the team’s arrival. As CAT 812 and the HHF hiked the final mile to the MEDCAP site, village loudspeakers blared, “The white people are here. They are white doctors who come to help.”⁴⁷ A rough communal cinderblock building served as the MEDCAP location.

A large congregation assembled inside the building. The group prayed before holding the MEDCAP. Then, HHF representatives introduced the CA team to the villagers, calling SSG Ost a doctor. He explained, “I am basically the equivalent to an ER trauma [physician’s assistant]. If I’m working with people who understand that, I will not go as a doctor. In foreign countries where there is not an understanding of those skills, I will.”⁴⁸ The MEDCAP started with pregnant women stepping on a scale to be sure that they weighed enough for the health of their unborn babies. (Kwashiorkor, or severe protein-energy malnutrition, is particularly prevalent in western Haiti.) At this point, the MEDCAP split in half with separate tables inside the building.⁴⁹

The HHF manned the first table. At that station, the medical personnel screened the patients and handled basic medical procedures like immunizations and distributing vitamins. SSG Ost commented, “The Haitian nurses provided good local knowledge.” They triaged the harder cases.⁵⁰ Those cases went to the second table, manned by SSG Ost and PFC Anse.

PFC Anse wore civilian clothes so the patients would be more comfortable in describing their maladies. She remarked, “I focus on being as accurate in my translation



CAT 812 medic SSG Dave Ost listens to a patient describe her symptoms. He diagnosed a bad case of pneumonia.


as possible, especially when it comes to the patient.”⁵¹ SSG Ost complimented her, saying that PVT Anse “was indispensable. She was one of the best interpreters I have ever had.”⁵²

SSG Ost assessed the cases, many of whom were elderly. “I knew I was going to get the elderly. [It] was mostly aches and pains.”⁵³ However, there were a few difficult cases, including maladies not often seen in the U.S. One woman had a necrotic finger that needed antibiotics to avoid possible amputation. Another elderly woman had tuberculosis. SSG Ost diagnosed one other patient as having a bad case of pneumonia. But, the patient in the worst shape was a three-month old girl.

A young mother brought in a child visibly suffering from a high fever. SSG Ost knew that the child had something very wrong and so he investigated further. He discovered a swollen, hot-to-the-touch shoulder joint. “I knew what it was immediately. Anytime you have infection in a joint



The mother and her baby wait with SSG Dave Ost while the HHF hospital staff at the *Klinik Pep Bondye-a* in Jérémie prepares the x-ray machine.



PFC Anastasia Anse (left) interprets as SSG Dave Ost (right) consults with Dr. Bordeau (middle), who made sure that the child was promptly admitted to the HHF *Klinik Pep Bondye-a* facility in Jérémie.



Dr. Bordeau found CAT 812 in the streets of Jérémie to show them the x-ray photographs of the child's shoulder. SSG Dave Ost, holding the x-ray, proved correct in his diagnosis, and the girl received antibiotics to help fight the infection. CPT Vick Cider is on the left and PFC Anastasia Anse is in the middle.



This three-month old girl was burning up with fever from an infection in her shoulder. The life-threatening condition required immediate treatment.

you run the risk of the joint capsule [tissue surrounding the joint] also getting infected.”⁵⁴ Infection had set in the child's shoulder to the extent that the blood vessels were noticeably enlarged. The child had a life-threatening condition requiring immediate hospitalization.

SSG Ost relied upon PFC Anse to convey the seriousness to the mother. She told the young mother that the child needed to go to the hospital. She needed to go home to make arrangements and then hurry back prepared to go. The mother appeared to understand the gravity of the situation, but seemed so scared that the team did not think she would come back.

However, in a half an hour, the woman reappeared, ready to go. “The mother was a young lady in extreme dire straits. She lacked an education but she knew that there was something wrong,” recalled SSG Ost.⁵⁵ Given the urgency of the situation, the three soldiers hiked back to the car and began the long trip to Jérémie.

On the way back the mother nervously held her baby tightly. She could not speak English so PFC Anse tried to calm her down. SSG Ost said, “We tried to make her as comfortable as possible. She had gotten into a vehicle with no one that she knew. Anastasia gave her as much info as possible.”⁵⁶ PFC Anse “did a good job of keeping her informed,” added CPT Cider.⁵⁷ A non-air-conditioned vehicle in the tropical heat and constant bouncing up and down and road dust did not help.

When CAT 812 stopped at a roadside store for fuel, they bought the worried mother a cold soda. This relaxed her and she volunteered more information. A month earlier the daughter's arm began to swell. She had been given a shot and sent home, but got worse. When the mother heard about the clinic, she took her daughter to be seen.⁵⁸

While on the road, CPT Cider called the HHF and made arrangements at the hospital. Antibiotics and an IV would be waiting. Once in Jérémie, the team went straight to the local hospital. The CA team got the child admitted promptly because of the prior coordination.⁵⁹

Dr. Bordeau, the Haitian physician in charge of the HHF *Klinik Pep Bondye-a* clinic, examined the girl. According to SSG Ost, “he said she was really in bad shape and asked me what I thought.”⁶⁰ Hospital staff immediately rushed the baby girl to get an x-ray and put her in intensive care. Then, the CA soldiers started back to their hotel to prepare a detailed report to JFSOCC-FWD on conditions in and around Jérémie.

However, before they got too far, Dr. Bordeau flagged their vehicle down. He had the x-rays that revealed that an infection in the child's shoulder joint had spread to the surrounding bones. Dr. Bordeau and SSG Ost agreed that the child needed an IV and antibiotics. The child would have died had the CA team not intervened.⁶¹

CAT 812 worked in Jérémie for the next several days. They continued to work with the local NGOs and identify needs in health clinics and orphanages. However, the



The HHF's Klinik Pep Bondye-a clinic.



CPT Vick Cider, right, consults with UN officials at the local Human Rights Office in Jérémie as PFC Anastasia Anse, left, interprets.

rescue of the little girl made the CA effort worthwhile. CPT Cider reflected, "Little instances like these are a small drop. We can't affect the whole ocean but here is one more child who will have a normal life."⁶² PFC Anse added, "It honors me to participate in these kinds of missions."⁶³ CA had clearly made a difference.

In Haiti, Civil Affairs demonstrated its flexibility and the value added it brings to ARSOF. The CA soldiers quickly assessed the situation and the needs of the population and then acted upon their evaluations to coordinate supplies and provide medical expertise. In a humanitarian assistance situation like post-earthquake Haiti, CA proved to be the proper element to demonstrate U.S. goodwill, and build rapport. "The fact that I had an American flag on my shoulder was all the villagers knew," commented SSG Ost. "Natural disaster is a CA goldmine."⁶⁴ ▲

TROY J. SACQUETY, PhD

Troy J. Sacquety earned an MA from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and his PhD in Military History from Texas A&M University. Prior to joining the USASOC History Office staff he worked several years for the Central Intelligence Agency. Current research interests include Army and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) special operations during World War II, and U.S. Army Civil Affairs.

Endnotes

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- 2 For more information on the earthquake see United States Geological Survey, "Magnitude 7.0-Haiti Region," found on internet at <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010rja6/>, accessed 13 August 2014.
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- 44 Cider interview.


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- 1 **The DoD dictionary of Military Terms lists several definitions for CE in addition to Core Element: including Casualty Estimation; Circular Error; Command Element; Communications-Electronics, Counterespionage; and Critical Element. Found on internet at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/, accessed 31 March 2015.**
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A True Force **MULTIPLIER**

Psychological Operations in Operation
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 1994-1995

by Jared M. Tracy

“Without a doubt, PSYOP won the hearts and minds of Haiti’s citizens, as well as [set] the stage for the peaceful accomplishment of the [JTF’s] mission. There is no question PSYOP saved lives, on both sides, during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. It proved to be the unsung, yet vitally important, factor in this operation—a true force multiplier. ”

— LTG Henry H. Shelton

On 5 May 1995, Lieutenant General (LTG) Henry H. Shelton, commander of XVIII Airborne Corps and Joint Task Force (JTF)-180, praised the recent accomplishments of Army psychological operations (PSYOP) in Haiti during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. “Without a doubt, PSYOP won the hearts and minds of Haiti’s citizens, as well as [set] the stage for the peaceful accomplishment of the [JTF] mission. There is no question PSYOP saved lives, on both sides, during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. It proved to be the unsung, yet vitally important, factor in this operation—a true force multiplier.”¹ This article explains how PSYOP earned such praise.

Between September 1994 and March 1995, active component and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) PSYOP units utilized leaflets, loudspeakers, and radio broadcasts to support U.S. and international efforts in Haiti. They also interacted closely with the populace, offering Haitians a positive, non-threatening view of the U.S. intervention. Overseen by the JTF-190/ Multinational Force-Haiti (MNF-H) Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) based in the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, the PSYOP effort advanced numerous themes during UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. These included Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s return to power on 15 October 1995, quelling Haitian-on-Haitian violence, weapons turn-in programs, and public health and safety announcements. Supporting both conventional and Special Forces (SF) units, PSYOP soldiers helped prevent a bloody conflict and fostered the peaceful return to democracy in Haiti.

After explaining the basis of the operation, this article will describe the organization and major themes of PSYOP in Haiti. It will also detail the efforts of several Brigade PSYOP Support Elements (BPSEs) and Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) in order to explain tactical PSYOP in Port-au-Prince, the northern coastal city of Cap-Haïtien, and other locations. While there were other tactical PSYOP elements in Haiti, the BPSEs and TPTs chronicled in this article were selected because of the abundance of sources on them and because their efforts adequately represent the overall tactical PSYOP campaign during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

Sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and with primary planning oversight by the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY stemmed from a longstanding political crisis in Haiti.² In September 1991, three years before the operation, the head of the *Forces Armées d’Haiti* ([FA d’H] Armed Forces of Haiti), LTG Raoul Cédras, led a successful military coup against President Aristide, who fled to the U.S. Cédras and his allies retained power through bribery, intimidation, imprisonment, and murder. The military takeover exacerbated the already poor living standards of the six million Haitians. The best that the average citizen could expect was a couple hours of electricity and an hour of running, non-potable water a day. The state of sanitation, transportation, and infrastructure was abysmal. Crime and disease ran rampant, especially in cities.³

PSYOP DUIS



1st Psychological Operations Battalion



9th Psychological Operations Battalion




2nd Psychological Operations Group



4th Psychological Operations Group



(L) Ousted from the Haitian presidency in September 1991, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was a ‘President-in-Exile’ for three years.



(R) Lieutenant General (LTG) Raoul Cédras, head of the *Forces Armées d’Haiti*, served as the *de facto* leader of Haiti from September 1991 to October 1994.

The USS *Harlan County* Incident

October 1993

In mid-1993, there was cautious optimism about the chances for political resolution in Haiti. President-in-exile Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the *de facto* leader of Haiti, Lieutenant General (LTG) Raoul Cédras, had recently signed an agreement to have Aristide return to the presidency on 30 October. However, the situation soon deteriorated. On 6 October, the USS *Harlan County* (LST-1196) set out for Port-au-Prince with 200 U.S. and United Nations troops on board to train Haitian armed forces and conduct “civil assistance projects.” Two days later, armed Haitian

mobs on shore prevented the *Harlan County* from docking, forcing the ship to turn back. Cédras supporters taunted the U.S. by threatening to turn Haiti into “Another Somalia” (a reference to the recent bloody battle in Mogadishu, Somalia, the historical basis for *Black Hawk Down*). The emboldened Cédras reneged on the July agreement and refused to allow Aristide to return. The ‘*Harlan County* incident’ was regarded as an insult to the U.S. and U.N. It was a devastating blow to international efforts to mend the political turmoil in Haiti.



All of these factors precipitated a refugee crisis. U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton repatriated refugees to elsewhere. The situation in Haiti prompted widespread international outcries, leading the UNSC to impose economic sanctions and consider military action to remove Cédras. However, in July 1993, Cédras and Aristide signed the Governor’s Island (New York) Accord to restore the president to power on 30 October. The UN lifted sanctions because political resolution seemed probable, but that optimism proved short lived.⁴ In late 1993,

Cédras’ supporters established the *Front pour l’Avancement et le Progrès Haitien* ([FRAPH] Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti) and stepped up attacks on Aristide supporters. Cédras reneged on the Governor’s Accord, causing the UN and U.S. to impose new sanctions. On 31 July 1994, UNSC Resolution 940 authorized the use of military force to remove Cédras (the *de facto* leader of Haiti) and the puppet provisional president, Émile Jonassaint. In addition, Aristide was to be restored to the presidency. Having already begun planning, USACOM, its rapid deployment force, XVIII Airborne Corps, and other U.S. military forces stepped up their preparations for a forced entry mission.⁵

In January 1994, Admiral (ADM) Paul D. Miller, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command (CINCUSACOM), had appointed LTG Hugh H. Shelton, Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, to head JTF-180 to begin operational planning for restoring the legitimate government of Haiti. In accordance with Operations Plan (OPLAN) 2370, the invasion would entail the airborne insertion of seven 82nd Airborne Division battalions (five into Port-au-Prince and two farther north), the seizure of twenty-six ‘sensitive’ targets by Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) elements (including airfields, police stations, and Camp d’Application, the regime’s largest heavy weapons depot), and the landing of a U.S. Marine Corps contingent in northern Cap-Haïtien. Additionally, OPLAN 2380 directed JTF-190, centered



In Port-au-Prince, Haiti, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, Admiral Paul D. Miller (center) speaks with the commander of the Caribbean Community contingent of MNF (left) in the company of U.S. Ambassador to Haiti William L. Swing (behind Miller’s right shoulder) and the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps and JTF-180, LTG Henry H. Shelton (right).




Under cover of darkness and armed escort, LTG Cédras and his family leave Haiti to take up residence in Panama, 12 October 1994.



LTG Shelton (right) greets Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher upon his arrival to Haiti, September 1994.



Among the many senior U.S. officials who visited Haiti after the peaceful U.S. entry were Secretary of Defense William J. Perry (center, in khakis) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN John M.D. Shalikashvili (just behind Perry) in Cap-Haïtien, 24 September 1994.



The U.S. Coast Guard intercepts Haitians *en route* to the U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton elected to turn back Haitian refugees.

around the 10th Mountain Division (-) under Major General (MG) David C. Meade, to serve as the main conventional occupation force.⁶ According to Stephen D. Brown, a former intelligence officer in the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG)(Airborne), USACOM “included PSYOP in all Joint Operations Planning Group meetings.”⁷ Accordingly, the 4th POG, the 1st Psychological Operations Battalion (POB) (A), and the 9th POB(A), all headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, planned for multiple entry scenarios and for support to post-conflict missions.⁸

In summer 1994, amidst invasion preparations, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Hugh W. Perry assumed command of the 1st POB. The 1976 U.S. Military Academy graduate and Foreign Area Officer had served in multiple capacities within the 4th POG, including deployments to Panama in Operation JUST CAUSE and the Persian Gulf in Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. He was the Chief of PSYOP Proponency in the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School prior to assuming command of the 1st POB. He recalled that the battalion had already begun developing products for Haiti, “but they were pretty generic. Only in the couple of months leading up to the operation did the situation get . . . understood enough or predictable enough to where the products could be refined.”⁹ With preparations for the invasion ongoing, a Washington, DC-based PSYOP effort for Haiti was underway.

In June 1994, a Military Information Support Team (MIST) led by Captain (CPT) Deborah Hake and consisting of 1st POB

soldiers, production specialists, and Creole linguists, launched the PSYOP effort for Haiti from Washington, DC. The MIST developed pro-democracy broadcasts, including statements by Aristide. Then, it forwarded the messages to the U.S. National Security Council and CINCUSACOM for approval. Finally, COMMANDO SOLO EC-130 aircraft from the Pennsylvania Air National Guard 193rd Special Operations Group broadcast them to the Haitian people. (An earlier airdrop of 10,000 radios had broadened the listening audience.) To supplement radio messages, pro-Aristide leaflets were also dropped. Specialist (SPC) Sherri Dicarlo, PSYOP Dissemination Battalion (PDB), Fort Bragg, reported, “Before we came down here [to Haiti], we printed up the leaflets they dropped ahead of the invasion and got a start on some of the jobs we knew we were going to have here.”¹⁰ By September 1994, months of PSYOP planning and preliminary activity had finally culminated.

The massive U.S. invasion was to start on 19 September 1994. LTG Shelton established his command post off-shore aboard the USS *Mount Whitney* (LCC 20). The 82nd Airborne Division and U.S. Army Ranger units readied for their airborne assaults. Two aircraft carriers were to be used as the launch platforms for JSOC and 10th Mountain Division elements (the USS *America* [CV 66] and the USS *Enterprise* [CVN 65]). At the last minute a final bid was made for a peaceful resolution. Former President James E. ‘Jimmy’ Carter, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retired General (GEN) Colin F. Powell, and Senator





This facility housed the JPOTF. Note the cots draped with mosquito netting in the foreground, the light printing station to the left of the bay door, and stacked boxes containing pre-approved leaflets at the rear of the photo. Administrative offices were located on the second floor above the main entrance.



Formed to improve the economies, standards of living, and well-being of member nations, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) sent a battalion to Haiti for security. Haiti joined CARICOM on 3 July 2002.

Samuel A. Nunn, Jr., met with Cédras in Port-au-Prince while the airborne units were *en route*. He relented and agreed to allow Aristide to return to power.¹¹

The U.S. rapidly switched gears to a permissive entry scenario. JTF-180 invasion elements stood down, but LTG Shelton remained on the scene to facilitate Cédras' and Jonassaint's relinquishment of power.¹² Other senior American officials visiting or working in Haiti after the successful U.S. entry included Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher, U.S. Ambassador William L. Swing, ADM Paul D. Miller, and GEN John M.D. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Maintaining peace and security in Haiti before, during, and after the transfer of power was JTF-190. Commanded by the JTF-190 commander, Multinational Force-Haiti became the designation for the international presence in Haiti. In January 1995, the 25th Infantry Division (ID) (-) under MG George A. Fisher relieved 10th Mountain Division as the MNF-H/JTF-190 lead. And on 31 March, the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) replaced MNF-H, ending Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.¹³ The U.S. Army PSYOP effort continued through March 1995 during all of these command transitions.

The senior PSYOP organization under JTF-190/MNF-H was the JPOTF, situated at Camp Democracy near the Port-au-Prince International Airport and commanded first by the 4th POG commander, COL Jeffrey B. Jones. When Jones rotated stateside soon into the operation, LTC Perry, 1st POG commander ('dual-hatted' as the Deputy JPOTF commander), took over. Many personnel comprising the JPOTF came from the 1st POG. The JPOTF also had a platoon-sized PDB detachment for printing and broadcasting support. Heading the printing section of the PDB detachment were CPT Gregory Jaksec (also the JPOTF officer-in-charge [OIC] of dissemination) and Sergeant First Class (SFC) Carlos Grimes, noncommissioned officer-in-charge (NCOIC). According to

Grimes, "These people here have printed every poster, leaflet, handbook, and book that's come out in this operation. Most people don't know that. They think this stuff magically comes from the States."¹⁴ Finally, the JPOTF supported tactical elements belonging to the 9th POB under LTC William H. Harris (mostly from B Company under MAJ Kevin L. Thompson) and the reserve 2nd POG from Cleveland, Ohio, by providing them with approved printed products.¹⁵

Tactical units looked to the JPOTF for product support and as a sounding board, but operationally they belonged to the ground combat commanders. According to the 1994 U.S. Army Field Manual 33-1-1: *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures*, a tactical PSYOP company could deploy one division PSYOP support element (DPSE) and three BPSEs with three to five battalion-level Tactical PSYOP Teams each.¹⁶ The BPSEs in Haiti had a coordinating relationship with the JPOTF, but they were ultimately brigade assets. Similarly, while BPSEs provided guidance and support to their subordinate TPTs, the teams also answered to the commanders of their supported battalion. Ideally, a TPT would support the same battalion throughout an operation, but in Haiti, TPTs were 'mixed and matched' to whatever units needed support. For example, "During the deployment, I coughed up two of my TPTs for an *ad hoc* detachment put together to support Special Forces," according to USAR Military Intelligence Officer CPT Louis M. Sand, OIC of the Port-au-Prince-based BPSE 21 (246th PSYOP Company, Columbus, Ohio).¹⁷

The PSYOP effort had begun as an active duty venture, but USAR units became a big part of it. On 15 September 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order (EO) 12927 "to augment the active armed forces of the [U.S.] for the effective conduct of operational missions to restore the civilian government in Haiti." This EO allowed the Secretary of Defense "to order to active duty any unit, and

any individual members . . . of the Selected Reserve.”¹⁸ On 20 September, Pentagon spokesman LTC Douglas Hart announced that 2nd POG elements would deploy to Haiti.¹⁹ USAR PSYOP units began arriving within the first month. In some areas they augmented their active duty counterparts, and in others they replaced them. In the case of BPSE 22, reserve detachment OIC, CPT Martin C. Schulz, said, “It was an OJT hand-off . . . We had to adapt to the procedures established by the unit that was leaving, but it’s worked out well, and our people are doing fine. Everyday we’re proving that reservists can fill the shoes of active duty guys.”²⁰ By early 1995, USAR units comprised over 80% of the tactical PSYOP force in country.²¹

Prior to detailing tactical efforts, a discussion of broad PSYOP themes for Haiti is in order. Naturally, themes reflected short- and long-term mission priorities. Media used to reach audiences included loudspeakers, printed products, informal personal discussions with the people, and radio broadcasts. (On-the-ground coordination by tactical PSYOP soldiers led to some Haitian-owned and operated stations allocating time for PSYOP messages.) Early on, loudspeaker broadcasts encouraged pro-Cédras militants to lay down

their arms and not interfere with U.S. operations.²² More persistent themes included neighborhood crime watch, preventing Haitian-on-Haitian violence, and urging political reconciliation. An early leaflet directed audiences, “Help us to help you. Support law and order. Report criminal elements. Do not loot.”²³ From 27 December 1994 to 1 January 1995, radio message 4N-07-20R told listeners, “Violence is not an answer to the road to peace and reconciliation. The new year is a chance to reconcile, start anew, and give peace a chance . . . A new year. A new start. A new Haiti.”²⁴ Broadcasted on the locally-owned Radio Cap-Haïtien from 8-11 January 1995, one message implored listeners: “Make your community a safer place to live; support and join your community watch program.”²⁵ One pre-recorded loudspeaker message quoted Aristide: “No to violence, no to vengeance, yes to reconciliation . . . These simple words of wisdom are a key to a successful democracy.”²⁶

PSYOP continually employed pro-democracy, pro-Aristide themes. For example, leaflet 4A-01-02L informed Haitians, “U.S. forces have arrived to restore democracy to your country.”²⁷ In October 1994, radio broadcast 4F-06-10R announced that “in a democracy . . . individuals have an

“No to violence, no to vengeance, yes to reconciliation... These simple words of wisdom are a key to a successful democracy.”

— Jean-Bertrand Aristide




These products represent three major themes of the PSYOP effort during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: the return of President Aristide; legitimizing security forces; and preventing crime, rioting, and Haitian-on-Haitian violence.



Two TPTs distribute printed materials and radios around Port-au-Prince from their M1025 HMMWVs. Most of the AA-battery powered AM-FM radio receivers distributed by TPTs were purchased in bulk from Radio Shack before deployment.

PSYOP Organization in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 1994-1995



avenue for meaningful participation both in government and in their own communities' successes."²⁸ Democratic messages would ring hollow if Haitians did not believe that Aristide's government could keep them safe. Due to the security vacuum in many parts of Haiti, the MNF-H and other international agencies had to provide security while building up pro-Aristide security forces.²⁹ PSYOP helped legitimize these organizations. One broadcast scheduled to air from 18-31 October urged Haitians to support the UN International Police Monitor (IPM), headed by Director Raymond W. Kelly. It said, "Police from CARICOM [Caribbean Community], Jordan, Argentina, and many other countries make up the world team of [IPM] . . . They are here to re-establish a peaceful society in Haiti . . . Please support their efforts, and together, we will make a difference!"³⁰ Support for the MNF-H, IPM, and the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) continued to appear in PSYOP messages.

The MNF/JTF PSYOP interface with the Haitian population was primarily the three-man Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs). These operated in major cities and in outlying areas throughout the country. They disseminated their messages via loudspeakers and in the course of face-to-face conversations with the Haitian people. They also distributed printed products sent by the JPOTF and even developed some of their own. One TPT leader described the equipment typically used by the teams: "An M1025 HMMWV, a vehicle-mounted AEM 450 Loudspeaker [estimated 1,000 meter range], and an LSS-40 Loudspeaker [estimated 350-500 meter range]. For protection, we carried M-16s, an M-203, and 9 mms."³¹ What follows is an in-depth account of tactical PSYOP in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, and elsewhere.

The heavily populated capital city, Port-au-Prince, represented a key area for such units as BPSE 960 (from B Company, 9th POB), BPSE 910 (from A Company, 9th POB), BPSE 21 (from 2nd POG), and subordinate TPTs. These elements urged public safety and a peaceful return to democracy. On 26 September, the TPTs under BPSE 960 (961-964) made loudspeaker broadcasts promoting Aristide and the MNF and advertising a weapons-for-cash program. On 27 September, one TPT conducted pro-Aristide messaging, two TPTs broadcasted civil order messages around police stations, and one TPT manned a weapons-for-cash site, part of the UN-sponsored weapons buyback program.³² In early October, BPSEs 960 and 21 both supported TF MOUNTAIN (a 10th Mountain Division *ad hoc* subordinate task force of JTF-190) by advertising weapons turn-in sites. They also provided 'on call' support to the 16th Military Police (MP) Brigade.³³ Peaceful dispersals of crowds, turning in of weapons, and relatively low levels of violence provided indications of PSYOP effectiveness.

Within the first month, PSYOP units operating around the capital worked to ascertain Haitian reactions to their messages and their general attitudes, which would help them with appropriate themes. On 7 October, BPSE 960 reported that many Haitians "still fear the FRAPH and Haitian military and police." A survey of residents of Pétionville just outside of Port-au-Prince revealed that most people were apathetic toward national leaders. One respondent said that Haiti suffered from a chronic "lack of leadership" at the top and "lack of talent" at the bottom, adding that "Aristide will not solve this endemic problem."³⁴ (This type of feedback only reinforced the need for PSYOP

"We also set up radio call-in shows where Haitians could speak to an ODA or company commander about utilities or what things would be like with Aristide back in power."

— SSG Perry M. Bartram

units to promote Aristide.) And on 12 October, three days before Aristide's return, BPSE 960 reported many cars around the capital displaying their bumper stickers, interpreting that as an indication of PSYOP effectiveness.³⁵

BPSE 960 and its TPTs continued supporting multiple units and missions in the days leading up to Aristide's return. On 11 October, TPTs 961 and 962 assisted 2/22nd Infantry and 3/14th Infantry (TF MOUNTAIN) with security missions while BPSE 960 and TPT 944 handed out 100 radios around the mayoral office building.³⁶ The next day, BPSE 960 oversaw the distribution of 1,300 radios around Port-au-Prince while its TPTs interacted with the local population. TPTs 961 and 944 provided support to the 16th MPs, using loudspeakers to help control crowds around Carrefour where a *FAd'H* station had been burned and looted.³⁷ On 14 October, the day before Aristide's return, TPTs 961, 962, and 944 played mixed tapes containing music and pro-Aristide messages while driving up and down Avenue John Brown (a key thoroughfare), near the Presidential Palace, in Carrefour, and around Port-au-Prince. These were the final missions for BPSE 960, which began preparations for redeployment on 15 October.³⁸

Primarily supporting 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division under COL Andrew R. Berdy, BPSE 910 and its TPTs (911-914) also operated in Port-au-Prince.³⁹ On 4 October, BPSE 910 assisted 1/22nd Infantry with loudspeaker support as part of a crowd control mission during a speech by Emmanuel Constant II, the anti-Aristide founder of *FRAPH*, in Port-au-Prince. (LTG Shelton had strong-armed Constant into publicly supporting Aristide on CNN.) After the speech, BPSE 910 supported MPs by helping them disperse the crowd peacefully. Later that day near Carrefour Stadium, BPSE 910 and TPT 932 distributed some 1,500 leaflets promoting weapons buyback, 700 copies of a leaflet explaining Haitian rights and responsibilities, and 700 miscellaneous leaflets. TPTs 913 and 931 supported C Company, 1/87th Infantry's seizure of a weapons cache formerly held by Cédras supporters, "to convince audience[s] not to resist and cooperate with [the] seizure of weapons."⁴⁰

Led by CPT Louis M. Sand, the reserve BPSE 21 augmented active duty elements around Port-au-Prince. BPSE 21 and its TPTs (211-214) were encouraged because "most of the Haitian people are [very] interested in what we give them," said Sand.⁴¹ On 10 October, TPT 211 supported MPs with crowd

control following Cédras' resignation. TPT 212 broadcasted news and information at a local school while TPTs 213 and 214 supported 2/22nd Infantry with the seizure of a weapons cache.⁴² On 12 October, TPT 211 disseminated handbills supporting the new police, TPT 213 performed a crowd control mission with MPs, and TPTs 212 and 214 helped distribute AM radios to citizens in Port-au-Prince anticipating Aristide's return.⁴³ Over the next 48 hours, the four TPTs distributed 2,100 radios, as well as 2,000 pro-Aristide leaflets and campaign buttons, in anticipation of the president's 15 October return.⁴⁴ Active duty and USAR PSYOP elements in Port-au-Prince thus played a key role in the relatively peaceful political transition in Haiti.

Outside of the capital, OIC CPT Brian Stackhouse 'split-teamed' BPSE 950 (from B Company, 9th POB) with detachment NCOIC SSG Perry M. Bartram. Stackhouse set up at Forward Operating Base (FOB) 31 in Pétionville, and oversaw three TPTs operating in the southern locations of Jacmel, Petit Goâve, and Les Cayes. SSG Bartram, a former Infantryman who, after deploying to Panama and the Persian Gulf, re-classed to PSYOP in 1991, set up at FOB 33 in Gonaïves to oversee two TPTs. One supported a 3rd



CPT Louis M. Sand, Military Intelligence Officer and OIC of BPSE 21, poses with orphans from Carrefour to whom he and his subordinate TPTs delivered food in November 1994.

SFG (A) Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) in Hinche in Haiti's Centre Department. The other TPT supported ODAs operating in multiple locations. Bartram's elements collected PSYOP-relevant information; disseminated JPOTF-approved products; helped control crowds with loudspeakers; and researched Haitians' attitudes towards allowing former Cédras supporters to serve as security forces. Having made arrangements with local Haitian radio stations, "We also set up radio call-in shows where Haitians could speak to an ODA or company commander about utilities or what things would be like with Aristide back in power."⁴⁵

Another center of PSYOP activity was the northern coastal city of Cap-Haïtien which, for practical purposes, was divided into ten operational zones. On 2 October, BPSE 940 (from B Company, 9th POB) under Field Artillery Officer CPT Anthony P. Arcuri, as well its subordinate TPTs (941-944), arrived in Cap-Haïtien to begin the PSYOP effort there.⁴⁶ BPSE 940 was soon augmented by the reserve BPSE 22 under CPT Martin C. Schulz. From October 1994 to January 1995, PSYOP elements in Cap-Haïtien supported units from 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division, led by COL James M. Dubik. After January, they supported units from 3rd BCT (TF BRONCO), 25th ID, under COL Gary D. Speer. The mission in Cap-Haïtien also involved support to 3rd SFG ODAs in outlying areas, as required.⁴⁷

Attached to 2/14th Infantry, TPT 941 consisted of Team Leader (TL) SSG Brent A. Mendenhall, Assistant Team Leader (ATL) SGT Darren R. Roberts, and SPC Jesse Bolka. SSG Mendenhall, a Light Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic turned PSYOP Specialist in 1993, recalled that 10th Mountain Division was "eager to incorporate TPTs into operational planning."⁴⁸ SGT Roberts, a former Combat Signaler who re-classed to PSYOP in 1993, described how TPT 941 integrated into 2/14th Infantry operations: "Brent or I would go up there to the S-3, 2/14th Infantry to find out what the missions of the day were. There was always a Quick Reaction Force mission, and that duty rotated between the battalion's companies. But since we were the only PSYOP element, we were on every QRF mission that rolled. So, we did both QRF and planned one- and two-day missions."⁴⁹

BPSE 940 and its TPTs advanced such themes as Aristide and democracy, non-violence, and support to the MNF-H and security forces. While presenting a 'friendly face' of the U.S. Army to the Haitian people, they also accompanied units conducting 'show of force' missions around the city. "The Haitians were a beautiful people. They were just absolutely ecstatic that the Americans were there,"

according to Arcuri. "They wanted anything they could get from us. They were so thrilled when they got their electricity back on, thrilled to get a soccer ball, thrilled to get a radio from us."⁵⁰

On 10 October, TPT 941 supported a 10th Mountain Division raid on a weapons cache and played a recently recorded Aristide speech via loudspeakers "to a very receptive audience." Meanwhile, TPTs 942 and 943 patrolled the city playing pre-recorded messages.⁵¹ The next day, TPTs 942 and 943 distributed leaflets promoting the IPM while TPT 914 used loudspeakers for crowd control during a trash removal operation. At 0900 hours on 12 October, TPT 941 conducted loudspeaker operations at Port Margot while TPT 942 supported 2/87th Infantry at a weapons turn-in site. TPT 914 soon began accompanying trash vehicles to dump sites to keep Haitians from interfering with 37th Engineer Battalion clean-up operations.⁵² As Arcuri explained, "We did a lot of route clearance stuff, telling them, 'Keep clear of military vehicles, keep clear of bulldozers, etc.'"⁵³

On 14 October, BPSE 940 and several TPTs prepared audiences for Aristide's return the following day. TPTs 914 and 941 broadcasted up and down the main thoroughfare (Route Nationale #1) while TPTs 942 and 943 zigzagged throughout Cap-Haïtien. Units also distributed radios so that Haitians could listen in to Aristide's speech the next day. Occasionally, handing out radios led to problems. As BPSE 940 reported, "Radios caused scuffles all day long. Everybody and their mother had a good idea on how we



Operating around Cap-Haïtien, TPT 941 (from B Co., 9th POB) consisted of (L to R) Team Leader SSG Brent A. Mendenhall, Assistant Team Leader SGT Darren R. Roberts, and SPC Jesse Bolka.

"The Haitians were a beautiful people. They were just absolutely ecstatic that the Americans were there... They wanted anything they could get from us. They were so thrilled when they got their electricity back on, thrilled to get a soccer ball, thrilled to get a radio from us."

— CPT Anthony P. Arcuri



Crowds gather in the main square in Cap-Haïtien in anticipation of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's return speech there. 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division soldiers provide security, while BPSE 22 use their loudspeakers for crowd control and to amplify Aristide's speech.



Personnel from BPSE 22 pose in front of the PSYOP support element headquarters. Standing left to right are CPT Martin C. Schulz (BPSE 22 OIC), SGT Daniel Stilson, SGT Jon McGinnis, SGT Gonzalo F. Villarreal, SGT Richard I. Keith, and SSG Jon A. Cartier (TPT 221 team leader). Kneeling left to right are SSG Marco A. Lopez (TPT 223 team leader) and SGT Kevin W. Buchaniec.



CPT Martin C. Schulz poses with Haitian children after handing out leaflets and meeting with a local radio station owner to discuss broadcasting PSYOP products, October 1994.

should have distro'd them, but no matter how hard we tried to control the lines with [a] linguist and speakers it was still mayhem." On the day of Aristide's return, TPTs gave City Hall pro-Aristide items to hand out, including buttons, T-shirts, and 200 radios. However, Cap-Haïtien city workers "chickened out of the radio distro game, so our . . . guys did it."⁵⁴

Operating in concert with BPSE 940 in Cap-Haïtien was the USAR BPSE 22 and its four TPTs (221-224). Consisting of SSG Jon Cartier, SGT Daniel Stilson, and SGTs Jon McGinnis and Duane Tumas from the 245th PSYOP Company in Dallas, Texas, TPT 221 supported 2/14th Infantry until 14 November 1994; 2/87th Infantry until 20 January 1995; and 4/87th Infantry (part of TF BRONCO) until the TPT redeployed on 25 February. Consisting of SSG Marco A. Lopez, SGT Gonzalo F. Villarreal, and SGT Richard I. Keith (also from the 245th), TPT 223 supported 2/14th Infantry until 14 November 1994. Thereafter, TPT 223 served at the brigade level until it redeployed on 25 February 1995. Only in Haiti briefly, TPTs 222 and 224 both supported 2/87th Infantry until redeploying on 5 December.⁵⁵

Just like their active duty counterparts, USAR PSYOP elements promoted Aristide in Cap-Haïtien before and after the transition. One reservist, SGT David G. Brown, remembered, "The people kept saying that they wanted to see Aristide. They didn't believe that he had come back. We asked the JPOTF to have him come up, and he did." While the 2nd BCT provided security during the November 1994 speech, BPSE 22 also directly supported the event. According to Brown, "I was on the stage with him. We actually ran the loudspeakers for part of the presentation and used them to broadcast his speech. The Haitians loved him."⁵⁶

Throughout the remainder of 1994, BPSE 22 and its TPTs promoted security forces, urged reconciliation, advertised neighborhood crime watch and weapons buyback programs, and offered Haitians public safety tips.⁵⁷ Among the original products produced by BPSE 22 was the *Cap-Haïtien Newsletter*, which contained news and information. By February 1995, BPSE 22 had printed ten issues of the *Newsletter*, and its TPTs had distributed 60,000 copies throughout Cap-Haïtien.⁵⁸ Daily loudspeaker broadcasts continued unabated. TPT messages on 17 January 1995 included "Graffiti is Inappropriate" and

"U.S. Forces are Going Through a Transition; Security Remains #1 Priority."⁵⁹ Those on 12 February included "Remember: No Toy Guns or Fireworks During the Mardi Gras Season" and "The [UN] Will Help Democracy Grow."⁶⁰ On 18 February, they included "The City of Cap-Haïtien is Cleaning Up" and "Don't Wear [MNF-H] Uniforms."⁶¹ And 21 February messages included "Keep Watching Your Neighborhood."⁶²

Although not required by the combat commanders or the JPOTF, BPSE 22 conducted post-testing to assess product effectiveness and general attitudes. Based on interviews with 372 Haitians, the first report concluded that Haitians had positive opinions of the U.S. and the IPSF but did not fully understand MNF-H's purpose. They also stated that political reconciliation hinged on economic progress. The report recommended expanding TPT coverage off the main roads; conducting PSYOP missions separately from combat forces; promoting MNF-H; encouraging Haitians to support *FAd'H* members providing security; and more face-to-face meetings with community leaders.⁶³

On 22 November 1994, BPSE 22 published another survey based on interviews with 600 Cap-Haïtiens. Nearly all respondents approved of the IPSF, liked the weapons buyback program, and favored political reconciliation. Citizens' most pressing concerns included employment, food, electricity, and security. BPSE 22 made essentially the same recommendations as in its previous report.⁶⁴

On 28 December 1994, BPSE 22 published Post-Test III covering 14 November to 14 December. Two hundred seventy Cap-Haïtiens answered sixteen questions about CARICOM, the IPSF, reconciliation, weapons buyback, the *FAd'H*, and media coverage and preference. The results again validated PSYOP efforts. Most respondents had heard loudspeaker messages daily and had read leaflets and/or the *Cap-Haïtien Newsletter*. However, they preferred getting their information from the radio, especially Radio Cap-Haïtien. Most respondents approved of CARICOM and the IPSF. While 92.22% favored political reconciliation, significantly fewer thought that the *FAd'H* should remain intact.⁶⁵



CPT Martin C. Schulz listens as Senior Airman Gabriel Montpoint (U.S. Air Force interpreter) broadcasts through the vehicle-mounted loudspeaker system, October 1994.



SSG David G. Brown and CPT Schulz solicit comments on their products, January 1995.



A reserve PSYOP soldier poses with a Haitian wearing a PSYOP shirt symbolizing U.S.-Haitian partnership.



CPT Martin C. Schulz stands among Haitians as one of his TPTs broadcasts in the main market square in Le Limbe, Haiti, December 1994.



President William J. Clinton greets 25th ID soldiers prior to the ceremony marking the formal transition from Multinational Force-Haiti (MNF-H) to United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), 31 March 1995.

Post-Test IV by BPSE 22 covered 15 December 1994 to 15 January 1995. Two hundred and forty Cap-Haïtiens responded to fifteen questions about such topics as crime watch programs, the IPSE, the upcoming transition from MNF-H to UNMIH, and the security situation in Cap-Haïtien. Most respondents supported local crime watch initiatives and the IPSE. More than half knew about the upcoming transition to UNMIH. Although 65% of respondents felt that they enjoyed a secure environment, residents expressed ongoing concern about employment, inflation, and crime.⁶⁶ Published on 19 February 1995, Post-Test V covered 15 January to 8 February. Of the 240 people surveyed, 70% approved of the IPSE. Awareness of the transition to UNMIH increased to 70% (half of the citizens wanted the UN to stay indefinitely). About 60% approved of their local governments, and 90% believed that they were better off than six months prior.⁶⁷ Post-Test V was the final survey conducted by BPSE 22.

BPSE 22 had contributed greatly to the PSYOP effort in Cap-Haïtien and elsewhere. Between October 1994 and February 1995, it made over 3,500 loudspeaker broadcasts, disseminated 400,000 leaflets, and produced the well-received *Cap-Haïtien Newsletter*. They developed and distributed over 20,000 original calendars ("our most popular and sought-after product") and handed out such items as soccer balls, radios, T-shirts, pens, pencils, notebooks, and bumper stickers. As evidence of PSYOP effectiveness in northern Haiti, BPSE 22 reported that Cap-Haïtiens had turned in 3,700 weapons and 50,000 rounds of ammunition by 25 February 1995 thanks to PSYOP promotion of the UN-sponsored buyback program.⁶⁸

By all accounts, PSYOP during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY succeeded. It helped shape Haitian attitudes toward such organizations as JTF-190/MNF-H, CARICOM, International Police Monitor, IPSE, and the UNMIH. It eased tensions surrounding the transfer of power from LTG Raoul Cédras and President Émile Jonassaint to the rightful leader, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. It had promoted various public health and safety programs, and performed crowd

control and 'show of force' missions. Most importantly, it helped prevent the country from descending into a bloody civil war by urging political reconciliation and deterring Haitian-on-Haitian violence. SGT Brown thought that PSYOP successes owed in large part to the personal, face-to-face time that PSYOP soldiers spent with the Haitian people. "Our job in PSYOP is to show a more human side to the people instead of walking around with weapons locked and loaded and ignoring them . . . We play tapes, have fun, and get out there and make friends with the people."⁶⁹

Commanders at all levels praised PSYOP. MG George A. Fisher, commander of MNF-H, JTF-190, and the 25th ID, said, "PSYOP was one of our top three combat multipliers . . . We used [it] very aggressively. Our teams focused on everything from the [UN] mission, to law and order, the justice system, the governmental programs that needed publicity, the programs to stop looting and counter vigilante justice, security for the carnival, to how the elector[al] process would work and how candidates would be registered. All of these require massive PSYOP campaigns. The PSYOP personnel . . . did a great job, in some cases turning the themes and products around in 24 hours. This allowed us to quickly impact on the local situation."⁷⁰ ▲

Acknowledgments: Thanks to COL (Ret.) Anthony P. Arcuri, 1SG (Ret.) Perry M. Bartram, MSG David G. Brown, CSM (Ret.) Brent A. Mendenhall, COL (Ret.) Hugh W. Perry, MAJ Darren R. Roberts, LTC (Ret.) Louis M. Sand, Mr. Douglas Elwell, Mr. Kent A. Bolke at the 10th Mountain Division and Fort Drum Museum, Ms. Kathleen H. Ramsden at the Topic Lightning Museum, Deputy PSYOP Commandant Mr. Timothy Fitzpatrick, and XVIII Airborne Corps Historian Ms. Donna L. Tabor for their assistance with this article. Special thanks go to COL Martin C. Schulz for allowing access to his extensive collection of photos and documents.

JARED M. TRACY, PhD

Jared M. Tracy served six years in the U.S. Army, and became a historian at USASOC in December 2010. He earned an MA in History from Virginia Commonwealth University and a PhD in History from Kansas State University. His research is focused on the history of U.S. Army psychological operations.

Endnotes

- 1 LTG Henry H. Shelton's quotation in 4th Psychological Operations Group, *PSYOP Support to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: A Psychological Victory* (Fort Bragg, NC: 1995).
- 2 For an excellent overview of the background of and U.S. Army role in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, see Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel, *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervention": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998).
- 3 *PSYOP Support to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY*, 3; U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Haiti: Operations Other than War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 1994), 1-4, II-1-II-9; Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Arata, "Psychological Operations in Haiti," <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/arata.pdf>, accessed 27 October 2011.
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- 5 *PSYOP Support to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY*, 4-5; John T. Fishel, "Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: Old Principles, New Realities," *Military Review* 78/4 (July-August 1997): 22-30.
- 6 Robert F. Baumann, "Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: Power Under Control," *Military Review* 78/4 (July-August 1997): 13-21; Hugh H. Shelton, *Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010), 224-227.
- 7 Stephen D. Brown, "PSYOP in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY," *Military Review* 76/5 (September-October 1996): 60.
- 8 *PSYOP Support to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY*, 14-16; John Fishel, *Civil Military Operations in the New World* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997), 214; Jeremy Patrick White, "Civil Affairs in Haiti," *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (no date): 2.
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- 10 *PSYOP Support to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY*, 6-8; SGT Don Smith, "PSYOPS Soldiers Bring American Message to Haiti," *CJTF Update* 1 (October 1994): 1.
- 11 Shelton, *Without Hesitation*, 229-230, 239-242; Fred Pushies, *82nd Airborne* (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2008), 23-24.
- 12 Shelton, *Without Hesitation*, 242-250.
- 13 *PSYOP Support to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY*, 5; White, "Civil Military Operations in the New World," 4; Martin C. Schulz, Kevin W. Buchanec, and Jon A. Cartier (BPSE 22), "Transition Book," 1995, copy in Martin C. Schulz Collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Schulz Collection.
- 14 Smith, "PSYOPS Soldiers Bring American Message to Haiti," 1.
- 15 The NSC and USACOM had approved many products before the intervention. In addition, early in the operation, COL Jones had proposed the creation of the interagency Information Coordinating Committee (ICC), headed by the Director of the U.S. Information Service, Stanley N. Schragger, to streamline coordination and approval of PSYOP programs and products in Haiti. The embassy approved the ICC, which first met on 27 September 1994. *PSYOP Support to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY*, 20-21.
- 16 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 33-1-1: *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), Annex 1. The modern day divisional support element is the Tactical MISO Company; the conventional brigade or SF battalion support element is the Tactical MISO Detachment; and the Tactical MISO Team supports the conventional battalion or SF company or team.
- 17 Louis M. Sand, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 21 December 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 18 President William J. Clinton, "Executive Order 12927: Ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty," 15 September 1994.
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- 20 Schulz's quotation in JoMarie Fecci, "Army Reservists Quell Haitian Fears with an Aggressive Campaign of PSYOPS and Smiles," *Army Reserve* (Spring 1995): 14-16.
- 21 *PSYOP Support to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY*, 21; Unknown author, "Units Support Operations in Haiti," *The Officer* (December 1994): 18.
- 22 Typically, loudspeakers were used to deliver specific instructions, as indicated by the following message: "Stop shooting! Drop your weapons and surrender now in this manner: 1. Remove the magazine from your weapon. 2. Tie a scarf to the muzzle of your weapon. 3. Sling your weapon over your shoulder with the muzzle pointed toward the ground. 4. Come out with your arms raised above your head. 5. Approach the U.S. soldiers slowly." Loudspeaker Broadcast, Product Control Number (PCN) IC-01-07LS, "Avoid Unnecessary Bloodshed," no date, and Loudspeaker Broadcasts, PCNs IC-01-05LS and IC-01-06LS, "Useless to Resist-Facing Superior Forces," no date, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 23 Leaflet, PCN 4F-02-05L, "Help Us to Help You," no date (sent by U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command via facsimile on 7 September 1994), copy in Schulz Collection.
- 24 Radio Broadcast, PCN 4N-07-20R, "New Year," 26 December 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 25 Radio Broadcast, PCN 4F-04-20R, "Community Crime Watch," 8 January 1995, copy in Schulz Collection; BPSE 22, "The Cap Haitien Information War," no date, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 26 Radio Broadcast, PCN 4N-01-13LS, "No to Violence, Yes to Reconciliation," no date, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 27 Leaflet, PCN 4A-01-02L, "U.S. Forces Have Arrived," no date, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 28 Radio Broadcast, PCN 4F-06-10R, "Help Us Help You Build a Better Haiti," 7 October 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 29 Nancy Nusser, "U.S. Forces Bugged Down in Haiti Quagmire," *The Plain Dealer*, 6 November 1994, Sec. 9A.
- 30 Radio Broadcast, PCN 4H-01-15R, "Civilians Support the New Police," 8 October 1994, copy in Schulz Collection; BPSE 22, "The Cap Haitien Information War," no date, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 31 Brent A. Mendenhall, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 15 April 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 32 BPSE 960, "Call In SITREP Worksheet," 26 September 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 33 BPSE 960, "Call In SITREP Worksheet," 9 October 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 34 BPSE 960, "SITREP," 7 October 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 35 BPSE 960, "Call In SITREP Worksheet," 12 October 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 36 BPSE 960, "Call In SITREP Worksheet," 12 October 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
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- 38 BPSE 960, "Call In SITREP Worksheet," 14 October 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
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- 40 BPSE A910, 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division, "PSYOP SITREP to DPSE 92," 4-5 October 2011, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Shelton, *Without Hesitation*, 251-252.
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- 43 BPSE 21, "Call In SITREP Worksheet," 13 October 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 44 BPSE 21, "Call In SITREP Worksheet," 14 October 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 45 Perry M. Bartram, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 13 April 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. ODAs operated in such locations as Saint Marc, Fort Liberté, Trou du Nord, Limbe, Port de Paix, Gros Morne, and Grande Rivière du Nord.
- 46 10th Mountain Division/MARFOR, "SITREP," 1 October 1994, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 47 Letter from CPT Martin C. Schulz to family, 9 December 1994, copy in Schulz Collection; BPSE 22, "Transition Book." Units belonging to 2nd BCT, 10th Mountain Division included 2/14th Infantry and 2/87th Infantry Regiments. 4/87th Infantry belonged to 3rd BCT, 25th ID.
- 48 Mendenhall interview, 15 April 2011.
- 49 Darren R. Roberts, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 15 April 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 50 Anthony P. Arcuri, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 1 June 2012, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 51 BPSE 940, "SITREP," 11 October 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 52 BPSE 940, "SITREP," 12 October 1994, and BPSE 940, "SITREP," 14 October 1994, copies of both in Schulz Collection.
- 53 Arcuri interview, 1 June 2012.
- 54 BPSE 940, "SITREP," 15 October 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 55 "Psychological Operations Support to 2d BCT-Cap Haitien, Haiti," 21 December 1994, copy in Schulz Collection; BPSE 22, "Transition Book."
- 56 David G. Brown, interview with Jared M. Tracy, 20 July 2011, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. The brigade S-3, MAJ Mark A. Milley, had overall jurisdiction during the speech.
- 57 See, for example, BPSE 22, "PSYOP Sitrep," 2 December 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 58 BPSE 22, "The Cap Haitien Information War."
- 59 BPSE 22, "BPSE 22 Message for Cap-Haitien," 17 January 1995, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 60 BPSE 22, "BPSE 22 Message for Cap-Haitien," 12 February 1995, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 61 BPSE 22, "BPSE 22 Message for Cap-Haitien," 18 February 1995, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 62 BPSE 22, "BPSE 22 Message for Cap-Haitien," 21 February 1995, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 63 BPSE 22, "PSYOP Post-Test Summary for Cap Haitien," 1 November 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 64 BPSE 22, "PSYOP Post-Test Summary II," 22 November 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
- 65 BPSE 22, "PSYOP Post-Test Summary III for Cap Haitien," 28 December 1994, copy in Schulz Collection.
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- 68 BPSE 22, "Transition Book."
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- 70 MG George A. Fisher, MNF-H/25th Infantry Division Commander, interview with MAJ J. Burton Thompson, Jr., 6 June 1995, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

OPERATION **EICHE**

The Rescue of Benito Mussolini



By the United States Army Special Operations Command History Office

Even after the war ended, Skorzeny and his wartime operations continued to be a topic of interest as he waited to appear before a denazification court. This was captured in a 9 August 1948 article in *Time* magazine:

“Token from Der Fuhrer

He had been a lieutenant colonel in Hitler's Elite Guard. He was intelligent, cunning, courageous. His face—ice-blue eyes, sabre-scarred chin, thin contemptuous smile—was a symbol of Nazi fanaticism. He denied most of the legends that had grown around his name (one: that he had been assigned to assassinate General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Said he: “Only a rumor. You can be sure that if any attempt had been made it would have succeeded”). But the truth about Otto Skorzeny was impressive enough.

In the summer of 1943, after Mussolini had become the prisoner of Italy's Badoglio Government, it was Skorzeny whom Hitler personally assigned to rescue the Duce. After weeks of dime-thriller spy work he located Mussolini in a remote hotel on the 5,560-ft. peak of the Gran Sasso in the Abruzzo Mountains northeast of Rome. He led an assault which reached the hotel by crashlanding gliders against the mountainside. Skorzeny reported: “Duce, the Führer has sent me as a token of his loyal friendship.” They flew out together in a tiny plane which had to take off by dropping 1,000 feet over a precipice.

Skorzeny surrendered to U.S. troops at Salzburg, in 1945. Since then, he had been in prison, first at Dachau, then at Darmstadt. His war-crimes trial, on charges of torturing U.S. prisoners, resulted in acquittal; but he was held in custody because a denazification court had not yet gotten around to his case. Last week he escaped. Somewhere in Germany, Otto Skorzeny had gone underground.”



Article: *Time* magazine, August 9, 1948.
Photo: U.S. Army Signal Corps.

Introduction

In November 1946, a U.S. Army combat infantry battalion commander, somewhat bored with postwar Occupation duty, volunteered for the 7734th Historical Detachment. Charged with interviewing captured German senior officers, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Theodore C. Mataxis, a National Guard officer from Seattle, Washington, formed a lifelong professional relationship with SS Major (MAJ) Otto Skorzeny. It was he who located and rescued the Italian *Il Duce*, Benito Mussolini, from his captivity on the Gran Sasso. LTC Mataxis, personally fascinated by this special operations mission, assisted in the debriefing of the “Commando Extraordinary” and his adjutant, MAJ Karl Radl.¹ The two were among the many senior officers being held in the Oberursel POW Camp in 1947, after being exonerated of war crimes by the Allied tribunal at Nurnberg. An inveterate professional ‘pack rat,’ LTC Mataxis kept a carbon paper copy of the original Gran Sasso interview. His son, LTC (ret) Theodore C. Mataxis Jr, shared that copy with the USASOC History Office.

The purpose of this collective essay is to graphically illustrate the Adolf Hitler-dictated rescue using period *Bundesarkive* photographs of the operation and rescue aircraft. It required considerable ‘manhunting’ to find *Il Duce* after he was secreted away on 25 July 1943 by the Italian national police. These Carabinieri were acting under orders from the Italian King Victor Emmanuel III. With Rome under Allied attack, King Victor Emmanuel was anxious to break ties with Germany and gain an armistice. Disinformation masked Mussolini's disposition. Germany scrambled to reinforce Italy after the Allied invasion at Salerno on 3 September 1943. Allied air superiority complicated the secret rescue operation. Mussolini was positively located on the Gran Sasso days before the Italian king announced an armistice. A fortnight later MAJ Skorzeny's airborne commandos swept down upon the alpine ‘prison.’ The surprise rescue of *Il Duce* proved to be a major Nazi Psywar coup that boosted military and civilian morale. It was true to the motto of Britain's 22nd Special Air Service (22 SAS), “*Who dares, wins*”—the critical element of success in special operations.

"However, as soldiers and optimists we believed in our mission and knew that, should even the merest possibility offer itself, we should take hold of it and do our duties as true soldiers."²

— SS Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny



Prime Minister Benito Mussolini



Prime Minister Pietro Badoglio

25 July 1943 Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini was dismissed by King Victor Emmanuel III, arrested and kept in custody by the government of the new Prime Minister of Italy, Pietro Badoglio.

26 July 1943 Hitler gave SS *Hauptsturmfuehrer* Skorzeny the mission to locate and rescue Mussolini in Italy.

"Adolf Hitler outlined in a few precise words his train of ideas.... The thought of his [Mussolini] imprisonment was unbearable and he [Hitler] regarded his rescue as an absolute duty as his friend.... He placed me under the command of Gen. Oberst Student. Details I was to discuss with Gen. Oberst Student. With these instructions I was discharged."

Note: Gen. Oberst Student was the architect of the German airborne assault on Crete in May 1941.



Skorzeny's Adjutant
Oberleutnant Karl Radl



Skorzeny ordered his deputy (Karl Radl) to select 50 of his *Jagdverbände* 502 commandos for the mission.

"50 men of my Jaeger Btl. Among these 10 officers and all men with a fair knowledge of Italian were to assemble the next morning on the Berlin airfield."

27 July 1943 Skorzeny and General Kurt Student flew to Rome and met with Field Marshall Albert Kesselring.

"No one had the faintest idea that Generaloberst Student and I were entrusted with locating the whereabouts of the Duce and with effecting his rescue."

29 July 1943 Skorzeny's commandos and elements of the Luftwaffe XI Air Corps established a base camp close to Rome's Pratica di Mare Airport.

"Most of my men were trained parachutists."



Feldmarschall
Albert Kesselring



Generaloberst Kurt Student

July – August 1943 Skorzeny and Radl discovered Mussolini had been moved from the island of Ponza, to La Spezia, and then the naval fortress on Maddalena Island off Sardinia.

18 August 1943

Radl developed the plan for Mussolini's rescue from Maddalena Island.

28 August 1943

Flown by seaplane from Maddalena to the Gran Sasso, Mussolini was confined in the Hotel Campo Imperatore.



Italian CANT Z 506



7 September 1943

U. S. Major General Maxwell D. Taylor secretly arrived in Italy to discuss the pending armistice with the Badoglio government.



Major General Maxwell D. Taylor



MG Taylor and Prime Minister Badoglio

*"Badoglio was far more deathly afraid of the Germans than of the Allies. The preservation of Rome from German reprisals was much more important than participation in any military operation that might facilitate the Allied landing, but would endanger the city."*³

"In the meantime the general position on the front had deteriorated rapidly. The allies had made successful landings in Sicily, and we had to send off one of our parachute divisions, to strengthen the front there."

8 September 1943

Skorzeny and Radl conducted an aerial reconnaissance of Gran Sasso at the same time the Italians signed the armistice and isolated the Germans in Rome. Undeterred, Skorzeny continued to search for Mussolini. This included a cover story whereby military doctors would visit Gran Sasso to determine its suitability as a malaria clinic.

True Love

"This is General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces. The Italian Government has surrendered its armed forces unconditionally. As Allied Commander-in-Chief I have granted a military armistice, the terms of which have been approved by the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, acting in the interests of the United Nations. The Italian Government has bound itself to abide by these terms without reservation. The Armistice was signed by my representative and the representative of Marshall Badoglio and it becomes effective this instant. Hostilities between the Armed Forces of the United Nations and those of Italy terminate at once. All Italians who now act to help eject the German aggressor from Italian soil will have the assistance and support of the United Nations."


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
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"Carefully weighing our chances my adjutant and I came to a disheartening result. We could only even give ourselves a very slight chance of success. But the order was there and we soldiers must carry it out. I went to my men and lined them up. I told them I was expecting in the next few days an order to undertake a most dangerous mission, and that we stood a damned small chance of 'pulling it off' and of surviving."

Mussolini Rescue Operation



10-11 September 1943 Skorzeny refined the rescue plan to use twelve DFS 230 gliders, assault Gran Sasso by air, and be supported by Major Otto-Harald Mors and a parachute battalion whose vehicle convoy would secure the lower end of the funicular railway between the village and Gran Sasso.



Skorzeny's postwar sketch showing where DFS 230 gliders landed on 12 September 1943.⁴



Major Otto-Harald Mors

"I outlined together with Radl our plan of action and presented it to Gen. Oberst Student. We wanted to land with gliders near the hotel and to overpower its garrison in a surprise attack. A strong detachment was simultaneously to creep up the valley (Avessano), to seize the Telphar-li-ne station, and to cover our retreat."



Hotel Campo Imperatore



German airborne ground assault force



Loading DFS 230 glider for the assault



Position of gliders at Gran Sasso



Skorzeny's glider

➤ **12 September 1943** After several delays, the attack force was airborne shortly before 1300 hours. Skorzeny in the third glider took the lead when the first two disappeared in the clouds.

"I expressly gave orders that come what may, no person was to open fire before I myself fired the opening shot. Should I be wounded or killed, then the first shot was to be given by one of the officers accompanying me."

"It was certain that no one expected an attack from the air and this was our one and only chance to 'pull it off.'"



Four minutes after landing, Skorzeny bluffed the 200-man Italian guard force into surrendering, and had Mussolini under German control. Then the Italian *Carabinieri* joined in the photo shoot.

"Not a rifle was lifted against us." "I reported to him [Mussolini] with the words: 'Duce, the Fuehrer has sent me as a token of his loyal friendship.'"

Lack of radio contact with Rome removed the planned aircraft extraction of Mussolini from the L'Aquila airfield. The last option was for General Student's personal pilot, Captain Heinrich Gerlach, to land his Fieseler 156C-3 *Storch* next to the hotel, pick-up Skorzeny and Mussolini, take off, and land at Rome's Pratica di Mare Airport.

"Our radio communications with Rome had broken down. I therefore had to take recourse to the second possibility."

"Now the last and most dangerous course was only left open to us. This 'storch,' piloted by a Captain who was the personal pilot of Generaloberst Student, was already circling the Hotel." ----->



Hauptmann Heinrich Gerlach



Assault force salutes Mussolini and Skorzeny

"On the other hand, I could not risk letting Mussolini start off alone, since all the responsibility would rest upon my shoulders should a mishap occur."



Fieseler Fi 156C-3 Storch

Thirty minutes after take-off Skorzeny and Mussolini landed at Practica di Mare, transferred to a *Heinkel He 111* medium bomber, and flew to Vienna, Austria.



"Shortly before midnight I was decorated by a General Staff Colonel of the Army in the name of Adolf Hitler with the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross... . The next day we continued our flight to the Fuehrer HQ in East Prussia... . I had to report and give a detailed account of our enterprise from beginning to end. Two days later I returned by air to Italy to fetch my men. As a reward we were given permission to cross Italy and the beautiful southern Tyrol in a motorized march to Innsbruck... . From Innsbruck we continued our journey by train to Friedenthal. Finally we were all given our well-earned leave."

13 September 1943 Hitler called and congratulated Skorzeny, awarded him the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, and promoted him to *Sturmbannführer* (Major). ♣



Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross



Analysis from: **SPEC OPS** by ADM William H. McRaven

The mission was well worth the risk for the following reasons:

1. Hitler demonstrated that he was prepared to take extraordinary steps to save his friends and allies.
2. The raid showed the continued professionalism of the German armed forces.
3. The mission may have actually forestalled some Italian resistance in the last two years of the war.
4. Nazi propaganda minister, Josef Goebbels, used the operation to promote the image of German superiority and instill fear among the Allies.
5. The mission established a precedent for future commando operations.⁵

Endnotes

- 1 Charles Foley, *Commando Extraordinary* (Reprinted [1957]; Ballantine Books, New York, 1957), *passim*.
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- 4 Otto Skorzeny, "Skorzeny's postwar sketch showing where DFS 230 gliders landed on 12 September 1943," National Archives Records Administration, Washington, DC, on internet at: http://hitlersraid.com/images/Sketch_hotel_02.JPG. Accessed on 6 October 2014.
- 5 William H. McRaven, *SPEC OPS: Case Studies in Special Operations Theory and Practice* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 188.

The Mataxis Legacy

BG Theodore C. Mataxis (Retired)

17 Aug 1917 - 8 Mar 2006 POB: Seattle, WA

- » H.S.: Lincoln H.S., Seattle, WA, 1936
- » 41st ID WANG BPED: 18 Oct 39, PVT to CPL, F Co, 116th QM Rgt & B Btry, 205th Coast Artillery Bn (AA), Camp Murray, Fort Lewis, WA
- » UW '40, RTC NG 2LT 8 Jun 40, PL, Co Cdr, 1st Bn S-1, 20th Inf Rgt (Fort Benning, GA) & cadre 6th Rgt, 70th ID, Fort Warren, WY, July 40-Jul 41
- » E Co Cdr & cadre HHC Cdr, Bn XO, and Bn S-3, 361st Inf Regt, 91st ID, Camp White, OR, Jul 41-Feb 43
- » USACGSC, Ft Leavenworth, KS, Feb-Apr 43
- » Asst G-3 & Bn XO & Cdr, 2/276th Inf Rgt, 70th ID, Camp Adair, OR & ETO, Apr 43-Aug 45
- » Bn XO & Cdr (1/3 Inf & 2/3 Inf) & Rgt XO, 3rd ID, Germany, Aug 45-Nov 46
- » 7734th History Det, US Forces European Theater & DCO 7808th SCU, Nov 46-Dec 47
- » G2 & G3 First Army, NY City & Strategic Intelligence School, Jan 48-Jul 50
- » Indian Staff College, New Delhi, India & UN Mil Observer India/Pakistan Border, Jul 50-Jul 52
- » XO to G-2, EUSA & Rgt XO & Cdr 17th Inf, 7th ID, Korea, July 52-Jun 53
- » Infantry Tactics Instructor, Fort Benning, GA, Jul 53-Aug 57
- » Army War College, Aug 57-Jun 58
- » Cof S, 8th ID, Dep Bde Cdr & Cdr, 1st ABG, 505th Inf, Mainz, FRG, Jul 58-Sep 61
- » Dep Chief, US Army Strategic & Tactical Analysis Gp, Bethesda, MD, Sep 61-Jul 62
- » XO, CJCS, Washington, DC, Jul 62-Jul 64
- » DLI Vietnamese & MATA Course, II Corps Sr Advisor, MACV & DCO, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, RVN, Jul 64-Aug 66
- » Div Chief, ODCSOPS, DA, Washington, DC, Sep 66-Apr 67
- » ADC (M), 82nd Abn Div, Fort Bragg, NC, Apr 67-Apr 68; Army Chief, MAAG-Iran, Apr 68-Jun 70, Tehran, Iran
- » ADC (M), 23rd ID, RVN, Jun 70-Feb 71
- » Chief, Military Equipment Deployment Team, Cambodia (MEDTC), Feb 71-Feb 72.

LTC Theodore C. Mataxis Jr. (Retired)


DOB: 6 Sep 1944 POB: Seattle, WA

- » H.S.: Walter Johnson H. S., Bethesda, MD, 1963
- » USAR BPED: 20 Oct 1962, 2nd, 11th, 18th, and 20th SFGs (USAR)
- » BCT: Jun 1963, Ft Knox, KY
- » AIT & Abn School: Sep 1963-Jan 1964, Ft Benning, GA
- » SFEQC, Ft Bragg, NC, May-Aug 1966
- » Gordon Military College 1967, commissioned 2LT USAR; IOBC, Rgr School & PL, A Co, 1/504 Inf, 82nd Abn Div, Ft Bragg, NC, Jan-Oct 69
- » PL, B Co, Bn S-5, S-2, D Co Cdr, 3/187th, 101st Abn Div
- » ARVN Abn Div advisor
- » G Rgr Co Cdr, 23rd ID
- » ARVN Border Rgr advisor, Nov 69-Jan 72, RVN
- » S-3 & ODA Cdr, MFF, A Co, 3/5th SFG, Ft Bragg, NC, Jan 72-Jul 74
- » IOAC 7-74 then Rgr Dept, Camp Darby & S-3 Ops, 1975-78
- » Iran FAO (Ft Bragg) & DLI Farsi, 1978-79
- » CSC Cdr & Bn S-3, 1/18th Inf, G-3 Current Ops, 1st ID, Ft Riley, KS, 1979-1981
- » AFSC, Norfolk, VA, 1982
- » JSOC J-3 Exercises & Evaluations, Ft Bragg, NC, & Grenada, 1982-87
- » XO & DCO, 7th SFG, 1987-88; Senior OPATT, El Salvador, 1988-89
- » 3rd SFG Activation Cell & USASOC Current Ops, Fort Bragg, NC, Jun 89-Jun 90
- » XO & DCO, 3rd SFG, Ft Bragg, NC, Jun 90-Jun 93



PSYCHE

The 301st Radio Broadcasting
and Leaflet Group **Part II**



By Jared M. Tracy

Stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) from 1951 to 1953, the 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group was the European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) strategic psychological warfare (Psywar) asset in the early Cold War. Part I on the 301st RB&L¹ recounted the Group's predecessors in the late 1940s, its October 1950 activation in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), and the start of its two-year federalization in May 1951. The article described unit members' skills and backgrounds, including how most of the radio broadcasting personnel came from the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) in New York. Part I explained the diverse training that the RB&L took at the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas, ranging from basic combat training to specialized Psywar courses. Finally, it covered the RB&L's November 1951 movement to the FRG to satisfy requests for a strategic Psywar unit from Major General (MG) Daniel C. Noce, Chief of Staff, EUCOM. This article picks up the 301st in Germany, detailing its organization, mission, and activities while deployed.

The 301st was functionally organized and chartered to conduct strategic Psywar. Consisting of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), a Reproduction Company, and a Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC), the Group had three overarching doctrinal missions, according to the Psywar School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. These were: conducting strategic Psywar with leaflets and radio broadcasts; assisting Seventh U.S. Army's tactical psywar asset, the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, as required; and supporting the broad U.S. global propaganda campaign.²



However, in accordance with U.S. national policy, the 301st RB&L did not engage in Psywar because Germany was not a combat zone. In April 1951, the U.S. National Security Council specified that in non-combat areas, the U.S. military could not conduct Psywar without the explicit approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (The U.S. Department of State had the lead on informational activities during peacetime.)³ Five years later, in FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*, the Army underscored that military Psywar could be used during wartime only.⁴

While the 301st RB&L did not conduct Psywar, this article explains how the unit prepared for that mission, as well as its various other activities. Headquartered at Sullivan Barracks in Mannheim, the Group researched Communist news, politics, and propaganda; developed propaganda scripts and programs; designed and printed non-Psywar products; and trained with other broadcasting agencies such as American Forces Network (AFN) in Frankfurt and Voice of America (VOA) in Munich.⁵ It also built rapport with the local German population and traveled around to 'sell' Psywar to other American units stationed in the FRG. The 301st began operations upon arrival in Germany.

Early in the deployment, 301st RB&L Commander, Colonel (COL) Ellsworth H. Gruber, and Executive Officer (XO), Major (MAJ) Howard A. Praeger worked on formalizing a long-term unit training program with the Psywar Branch, Division of Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training, EUCOM. In the meantime, soldiers received classes on the organizational structure of EUCOM and Heidelberg Military Post (HMP), and on European politics and history.⁶ First Lieutenant (1LT) Robert M. Zweck, a transcription and sound engineer in the MRBC, recalled "intensive" classes to instill "a fundamental knowledge of the German language."⁷ Before long, the RB&L's staff and companies were up and running.

Commanded first by Captain (CPT) James J. Patterson and later by First Lieutenant (1LT) Lester S. MacGregory, the HHC consisted of the personnel working in the Group staff sections. Under 1LT Edward Starr, the S-1 handled the Group personnel requirements. Headed by CPT Edward A. Jabbour and later by 1LT Albert Somit, the S-2 (Intelligence) wrote country assessments, studied foreign media, trained in prisoner interrogation, and analyzed foreign broadcasts



European Command Shoulder Sleeve Insignia (SSI) as of 23 June 1947; re-designated for U.S. Army, Europe, on 7 November 1952.

LTG Daniel C. Noce, veteran of both world wars, served as post-WWII Chief of the Civil Affairs Division prior to assuming responsibilities as EUCOM Chief of Staff from 12 August 1950 to 31 May 1952. LTG Noce was The Inspector General (TIG) of the Army before retirement.



1LT Robert M. Zweck (center), former National Broadcasting Company (NBC) radio technician then serving as a transcription and sound engineer in the MRBC, poses with two soldiers on guard duty at Sullivan Barracks in April 1952.




The son of a Lithuanian army officer, CPL Cesare G. Ugianskis (L) came to the U.S. in 1949, worked odd jobs in Chicago, and enlisted in the U.S. Army on 13 June 1950. In mid-1951 he transferred from the 1st RB&L Group to the 301st RB&L as a linguist in the S-3.

recorded by the MRBC Monitoring Section.⁸ While the S-1 and S-2 performed generally routine functions, the S-3 (Plans and Operations) played a critical role in Psywar training.

Under CPT Parker D. Snow (who later became Group XO), the S-3 supervised Group training, helped write country studies, and during wartime would develop Psywar themes and products.⁹ Writing propaganda required creativity and skills in influencing others, and the S-3 had smart, talented soldiers for that task. These included several who “came from the advertising industry,” remembered MRBC radio officer Second Lieutenant (2LT) John W. Evans, Jr.¹⁰ Writers could make use of information gathered by S-3 linguists. Corporal (CPL) Julien J. Studley, an S-3 linguist, remembered, “I read the papers and cut out things I thought would be useful.”¹¹ When not scheduling training, inspections, or projects for linguists, Operations Sergeant (SGT) Peter K. Dallo (a fluent German speaker) also scanned German newspapers for items of potential Psywar value.¹²

301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group


Organization Under European Command
1 January 1952



In addition to reading various European periodicals, S-3 linguists also tuned in to foreign radio broadcasts. That process could yield important new information. For example, in early March 1953, CPL Cesare G. Ugianskis (an ethnic Lithuanian serving as an S-3 linguist) heard the breaking news on Radio Moscow that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had died, a good piece of information even

WWII Infantry Officer CPT Parker D. Snow served as Group S-3 prior to becoming the Executive Officer for both the 301st and 7721st RB&L Groups.





Division between East and West Germany after 1949

Post-war administrative regions:

- British
- American
- French
- Soviet

COLD WAR EUROPE

THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT OF THE 301st RB&L GROUP

Europe in the early 1950s was a tense political environment due to the Cold War between the U.S., the Soviet Union, and their allies. The Cold War stemmed from many events, including the post-WWII partition of Europe; the Soviets' blockade of Berlin starting in June 1948 (and the West's airlift of supplies); the 1949 'loss' of China to the Communists; and the June 1950 North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea. President Harry S. Truman had committed to supporting foreign peoples against outside Communist aggression (later called "containment"), a central approach to U.S. foreign policy strategy for years to come.


Even though the U.S. was fighting a hot war in Korea to contain Communism, Germany was widely regarded as the center of the East-West divide and the place where the next world war would start. After WWII, the victors partitioned the formerly unified Germany as part of the postwar occupation. In 1949, Germany split into two sovereign nations: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG ['West Germany']) under Western sponsorship and the German Democratic Republic (GDR ['East Germany']) under Communist sponsorship. Situated in the GDR, Berlin was similarly divided into West Berlin and East Berlin in 1949. Erected in 1961, the Berlin Wall separating East from West Berlin stood for some 30 years as a harrowing symbol of the Cold War.

When the 301st RB&L Group deployed to the FRG in November 1951, U.S. forces in Europe were

shifting focus from occupation duty to defense and deterrence against the Communist military threat. In September 1951, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated Soviet strength in the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria (Soviet Zone), Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria, as 455,500 ground troops and 2,600 aircraft. Of these totals, 66 percent of soldiers and 50 percent of aircraft were in the GDR. Soviet forces bolstered these nations' own militaries, which contained another million soldiers.¹ A member of the 301st RB&L Headquarters Company, Corporal Alan E. Bandler, recalled "a genuine fear that the Soviet army would attempt to overrun Europe."²

At the time, the U.S., as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had about a third as many soldiers in the FRG as the Soviets did in the GDR.³ The U.S. boosted its numbers significantly over the next two years. By late 1951, European Command consisted of three major commands: Seventh U.S. Army (consisting of V Corps with the 2nd Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions, and VII Corps with the 1st, 28th, and 43rd Infantry Divisions), Twelfth Air Force, and U.S. Naval Forces, Germany. It also controlled fourteen additional subordinate commands and units situated in Europe.⁴ Thus, the tense political atmosphere and massive military buildups on both sides made Europe, especially Germany, ripe for a potentially major and devastating conflict.

ACHTUNG!
Sie verlassen jetzt
WEST-BERLIN



84th ID (World War II) veteran-turned-newspaperman in Riverton, Wyoming, CPT Leroy E. Peck (center, kneeling), and the rest of the Reproduction Company, pose for a unit photo outside of Sullivan Barracks in 1952.



301st RB&L Commander, COL Ellsworth H. Gruber (C), poses with his twin sons, SGT Donald A. Gruber (L) and PVT Gerald A. Gruber (R), for a Mother's Day photo in May 1952. Both brothers worked in the Headquarters Company.



COL Ellsworth H. Gruber, 301st RB&L Commander (L), and CPT Leroy E. Peck, Reproduction Company Commander (second from left), showcase the printing facility and equipment to Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Richard G. Ciccolella, EUCOM Psywar Officer (second from right), and Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, Chief of Psychological Warfare in the Pentagon (R), in 1952.

“Printing jobs of all kinds were undertaken”

— COL Frank A. McCulloch,
301st RB&L commander



The Reproduction Company printed products for other units stationed in Germany, including these holiday menus for the 46th Anti-Aircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion, the 301st Signal Group, and the 17th Special Service Company.

if it did not have immediate Psywar value.¹³ By virtue of the linguistic ability to gather relevant foreign information and propaganda skills in writing effective leaflets and radio scripts, the S-3 performed critical functions for the Group. Rounding out the 301st RB&L staff was the S-4.

Headed by former MRBC commander CPT William B. Buschgen and later by 1LT Freeland L. Townsley, the S-4 handled the Group supply and logistical requirements.¹⁴ Among the enlisted personnel in the S-4 were the commander's twin sons, SGT Donald A. and CPL Gerald A. Gruber. Although an Infantryman by Military Occupational Specialty, CPL Gruber snagged the only vacant slot in the section: Supply Record Specialist. He took logistical training in Lenggries, FRG, before going to work in the Group supply warehouse. He remained in the S-4 until mid-1953, when he successfully transferred 301st RB&L property to its short-lived successor, the 7721st RB&L Group.¹⁵ The S-4 and the rest of the staff supported the two functional companies, Reproduction and the MRBC.

CPT Leroy E. Peck commanded the Reproduction Company. The 84th Infantry Division WWII combat veteran and postwar newspaper publisher in Riverton, Wyoming, was recalled to active duty after the Korean War began. Peck knew the army “from buck private to combat-experienced commanding officer,” and was COL Gruber's ‘go-to’ man.¹⁶ 1LT Zweck remembered him as “a real tough guy.”¹⁷ Peck was an ideal leader to instill a sharp training focus in his company.

Consisting of a headquarters section and Reproduction Platoon, the company's wartime mission involved printing leaflets based on themes and designs provided by the S-3.¹⁸

However, as previously described, the company could not print or disseminate actual Psywar products during peacetime. Reproduction personnel clearly understood that policy. Printing foreman Staff Sergeant (SSG) Alphonse A. Principato remembered, “We couldn't distribute the leaflets outside of the *Kaserne* because that was an act of war.”¹⁹ Private Albert A. Hartinian, Reproduction Company photographer, seconded, “Nothing was supposed to go across the line [into Eastern Europe].”²⁰

Despite this prohibition on putting out actual propaganda, Reproduction Company did plenty of printing. It printed training aids, programs, menus, and other items for various units, “and we even did some commercial projects,” recalled Offset Pressman CPL Thomas F. McCulley.²¹ “Printing jobs of all kinds were undertaken,” echoed COL Frank A. McCulloch, 301st RB&L commander as of 11 September 1952.²² For example, on 19 May 1952, the company began printing 10,000 four-page, three-color programs for a Seventh Army event. Three months later it printed 250,000 tactical leaflets for training by the 5th L&L, which was low on paper at the time.²³ In September 1952, Reproduction Company “printed many pamphlets and booklets for [USAREUR], Heidelberg Military Post, and many other organizations as training projects for technical personnel.”²⁴ The company turned out humorous products as well.

According to SSG Principato, the Reproduction Company printed leaflets with satirical cartoons drawn by S-3 artists. Topics were based on Radio Moscow broadcasts that the MRBC's Monitoring Section had recorded. For example, one artist “drew a picture of [Dwight D.] Eisenhower with a rough beard, hand grenades hanging from his lapels,

two guns beside him, and walking down Broadway.” Principato paraphrased the caption: “Eisenhower Starts His Presidential Campaign.” That cartoon depicted Soviet fears of an Eisenhower presidency. The Reproduction Company printed 150 copies to give a laugh to soldiers on the *Kaserne*.²⁵ These assorted newsletters, leaflets, pamphlets, programs, and cartoons demonstrated the range of products printed by the company on behalf of the RB&L.

Reproduction’s sister company, the MRBC, was organized, manned, and equipped for strategic radio broadcasting. Commanded by 1LT Robert H. Barnaby, the MRBC had a headquarters, a Monitoring Section, and a Mobile Radio

Platoon that could split into detachments. (The company lacked enough personnel for three complete Mobile Radio Platoons as prescribed in Table of Distribution [T/D] 250-1203).²⁶ Former NBC employees furnished much of the company manpower. “There was this strange mix of very talented and outstanding people that were the core group from [NBC in] New York,” recalled radio officer 2LT John W. Evans, Jr. (Evans was not among the NBC ‘originals’ because he had joined the unit at Fort Riley after completing 13-week-long Signal Officer training at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey).²⁷ Just as the Reproduction Company could not distribute Psywar leaflets, the MRBC could not conduct Psywar via radio. Still, the company set up its studios to train for its wartime role.

The MRBC required extensive studio equipment if it were to run “24-hour-a-day operations of news, special events, and propaganda,” according to 1LT Zweck.²⁸ Radio engineer SSG Robert R. Rudick remarked, “We knew what we needed to run a studio—turntables, OP-7s [remote broadcast mixers], and tape-recorders, which we were able to get. There was an announcer’s booth, and you could run a regular talk show from in there.”²⁹ However, not all of the necessary equipment had accompanied the MRBC to Germany. The task of transporting additional materials from the U.S., notably a 180’ antenna tower, had fallen on a three-man team.

1LT Elmer R. Mosher, CPL Edward J. Mangold, and PFC Arthur J. Martin did not deploy with the 301st main body. Instead, they had stayed behind at Brooklyn Army Base, New York, to await the arrival of an antenna tower and other equipment ordered from the Gates Radio Company in Quincy, Illinois. Upon arrival, the team supervised the loading of the crated equipment onto the chartered SS *American Scout*, which soon departed for the FRG. The three soldiers pulled into Bremerhaven in the spring of 1952 (months after the main body) and traveled by jeep to Sullivan Barracks to await the crates. The job of using three M35 2½-ton “deuce and a halves” to convoy the boxed equipment from Bremerhaven to Mannheim fell on 2LT David L. Housman, SSG Rudick, and a few other MRBC soldiers.³⁰

According to Martin, upon arrival, “The boxes of antenna parts (a do-it-yourself sort of kit) were [placed] up in the second floor of one of the motor pool garages. There they sat until the decision was made to put it together and erect it out in the field where the transmitter trailer was located.”³¹ “Martin was a big part of the construction of that tower,” said Rudick. Due to the shortage of on-hand riggers, “we got three soldiers who were in the slammer to help.”³²

First, the riggers painted the tower’s mast sections red “to provide enhanced visibility [for aircraft] when it was erected.” Then, the bottom insulator was bolted to the recently installed concrete base. “The three ground anchors were positioned and screwed into the semi-sandy soil to use as temporary anchor points . . . The first section was balanced on the insulator and temporarily guyed. Then the remaining pre-assembled sections, alternating



“Eisenhower Starts His Presidential Campaign.”

— cartoon caption paraphrased by SSG Alphonse A. Principato

This is an artist’s rendition of a satirical cartoon developed by the S-3 propagandists based on intercepted Radio Moscow broadcasts. It was then printed in leaflet-size by the Reproduction Company and disseminated to troops on the *Kaserne*. (Illustration by Mariano Santillan.)

silver and red, were bolted together, using temporary guy wires to keep all the sections as near vertical as possible.”³³

After bolting in the top section, the team made final adjustments to the guy wire tensions to ensure a steady vertical alignment of the tower. Then, late one afternoon, Martin attached and wired aircraft warning lights “just as a good sized thunderstorm was advancing from the direction of Mannheim. I finished that job as quickly as possible before the storm reached us.” Finally, they connected the warning lights to an electrical supply and connected the transmitter trailer to the lowest antenna section. Not counting installation of the concrete base, assembly of the tower took about a week. According to Martin, “COL Gruber could be justifiably proud. No one got injured on the job.”³⁴ This and the rest of the equipment facilitated the company’s long-range broadcasting capability.

As the MRBC procured and set up its equipment, personnel trained on broadcast production and programming. This frequently involved temporary duty (TDY) assignments to work with other broadcasting agencies, namely the AFN and the VOA. On 7 January 1952, 2LTs David L. Housman and Edward E. Kaufman, Sergeant First Class (SFC) Frank R. Weber, and SGT George D. Abercrombie left for a 30-day TDY with AFN, a U.S.



Depicted here is the standard studio set-up in the MRBC’s 35-foot transmitter van (AN/MRT-5), including a mixing board with two master mix faders, a 1/4” tape recorder, and a 33 1/3 RPM turntable. Except for the tape recorder, all equipment was made by Gates Radio Company, Quincy, Illinois.

“Martin was a big part of the construction of that tower” [Due to the shortage of on-hand riggers] “We got three soldiers who were in the slammer to help.”

— SSG Robert R. Rudick



301st RB&L Commander COL Ellsworth H. Gruber (third from right) and other Group officers explain the nuances of the MRBC’s transmitter van (AN/MRT-5) to the visiting Chief of Psywar, BG Robert A. McClure (third from left).



SSG Edward Berman and PFC Max Diamond of the MRBC stand at the concrete base of the 180-foot Gates Radio Company antenna that was transported overseas by 1LT Elmer R. Mosher, CPL Edward A. Mangold, and PFC Arthur J. Martin in early 1952.



PIERCING THE IRON CURTAIN

In the early 1950s, the U.S. Army 301st RB&L Group was not the only American governmental organization capable of broadcasting in Europe. For example, the U.S. Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sent information and propaganda into the Iron Curtain via the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe (RFE), and Radio Liberty. In addition to these agencies targeting Communist countries, the U.S. military-run American Forces Network (AFN) oriented its programs toward Americans living and serving in Europe.

Established in 1942 under the wartime Office of the Coordinator of Information and later run by the Office of War Information, the VOA had promoted American aims during World War II. After the war, Congress slashed the VOA by some 80 percent. However, for fiscal year 1947, it approved \$7.8 million in funding and 321 new personnel for the State Department-run VOA, headquartered in New York City. This enabled the agency to broaden its broadcasting scope (by mid-1951, it had programming in 45 languages running a total of nearly 400 hours a week). On 17 February 1947, the VOA made its first Russian broadcast from Munich with three 85,000-watt transmitters to “give listeners in the USSR a picture of life in America.”¹

As programming expanded, U.S. policymakers increasingly viewed the VOA as a ‘weapon’ to use against the Soviet Union and its satellites. The Soviets viewed the VOA as such a threat that in April 1949 it began aggressively ‘jamming’ its broadcasts into the Iron Curtain. According to the VOA, “Somebody obviously considers it dangerous to permit the Soviet people to listen to truthful information from a free radio.”²

military-run network with programming for American personnel stationed in Europe. 1LT William R. Hevell trained with AFN for two weeks in February. Another team followed him in March. Two months later, other MRB soldiers trained with VOA, a broadcasting asset of the State Department.³⁵ These TDYs helped MRBC personnel learn more about developing effective programs.³⁶ In order to stay abreast of Communist propaganda (which was critical background for developing Psywar programming), the MRBC tracked foreign radio programs.

The Monitoring Section tuned into and recorded Communist programming from Radios Moscow, Berlin, Warsaw (Poland), Brasov (Romania), Bucharest (Romania), and Pirenaica (an underground Communist station for Spanish audiences). PFC Martin remembered, “I spent most of my duty hours monitoring various radio frequencies [being] tape recorded . . . for interpretation by

the intelligence section utilizing the equipment in the radio intercept shelter.”³⁷ The Monitoring Section forwarded recordings to the S-2 for translation, analysis, and collation into *Propaganda Review*. The RB&L then pushed that daily intelligence product up to USAREUR and EUCOM.³⁸ The Monitoring Section continued intercepting foreign broadcasts amidst other MRBC initiatives.

The MRBC executed numerous training and experimentation programs. In January 1952, 1LT Zweck launched an internal “anti-jamming” training course, a relevant lesson given Soviets’ blocking of VOA broadcasts into Eastern Europe in 1949-1950. In June, the MRBC began collaborating with the recently activated twelve-man 7878th Augmentation Detachment (Balloon) to test barrage balloons for broadcasting. The detachment raised a balloon antenna and successfully made a broadcast on 12 August, but the cooperative program


Also broadcasting were Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. After WWII, George F. Kennan of the State Department and Frank G. Wisner of the CIA's Office of Policy Coordination gradually developed the concept for RFE and Radio Liberty. Funded by the CIA, RFE began experimental Czech broadcasts on 4 July 1950. Within the next year, RFE had established its base of operations in Munich and had added programming in five languages. In March 1953, RFE was supplemented by Radio Liberty (initially Radio Liberation), which broadcasted in Russian and other languages. As part of broadcasting anti-Communist, democratically-slanted information into the Iron Curtain, these agencies gave "a voice to dissidents and opposition movements" without overtly advocating subversion.³

Complementing these outlets was AFN Europe, established in London in 1943 to broadcast news and entertainment to deployed U.S. service-members. The network added dozens of studios during the war as the Allies liberated Western Europe. Between 1945 and 1950, AFN Europe added many stations in Germany, including AFN Munich, AFN Bremen (later AFN Bremerhaven), AFN Berlin, AFN Frankfurt, AFN Stuttgart, and AFN Nuremberg. (AFN Europe's headquarters were in Hoechst Castle near Frankfurt.) The AFN was one agency that the 301st RB&L trained with frequently during its time in the FRG (1951-1953).⁴

While AFN's audience was Americans (service-members, their families, and civilian defense employees), the State Department and the CIA broadcasted directly into the Iron Curtain via the VOA, RFE, and Radio Liberty. In accordance with the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, they did so to "promote a better understanding of the [U.S.] in other countries," but also to foment popular discontent with Communism.⁵ However, the U.S. Army 301st RB&L Group could not broadcast into Eastern Europe due to U.S. policy against the military using Psywar during peacetime.

concluded on 29 August. Also in August, the company tested a new miniature tape recorder and loudspeaker and participated in a four-day Command Post Exercise (CPX).³⁹ Five months later, the company put its training to use with a 'real-world' assignment.

In January 1953, the MRBC received the tasking to assist AFN. An intervening mountain range kept Frankfurt-based AFN broadcasts from reaching U.S. Army units in Kaiserslautern (some 75 miles southwest). The MRBC delegated one detachment to set up mobile equipment in Kaiserslautern to relay AFN to troops there. Led by 2LT Robert E. Shepard, this detail consisted of 2LT Harvey W. Johnson; Master Sergeant (MSG) Wilburn W. Rockett; SGTs George D. Abercrombie, and William F. Burke, Jr.; CPLs Edward J. Mangold, John R. O'Keefe, William R. Kreklau, Ronald G. Kampel, and Richard J. Lerner; and PFCs Arthur J. Martin, Harry McCune, Michael J. Stoppleman, and



The Iron Curtain isn't soundproof.

And so the truth is broadcast, through the air, where it can't be stopped by walls and guards, up to 18 hours a day to millions of people in the closed countries behind the Iron Curtain.

Will you help the truth get through? Whatever you can give will mean a great deal to a great many people behind the Iron Curtain.

Send your contribution to:

Radio Free Europe, Box 1965, Mt. Vernon, N. Y.



George Murphy.⁴⁰ The group packed its equipment and convoyed from Mannheim to Kaiserslautern.

On 15 January, the MRB detachment arrived near the Vogelweh Shopping Center, where it met three Germans contracted to assist with rigging. Delayed due to inclement weather, construction of the tower began the next day. MRB soldiers "dug innumerable holes for telephone poles, guy wires, latrines, drainage pits and so forth. The transmitter van and tuning shelter were jockeyed into position while the engineers readied the transmitter for action. German power was installed, and on 6 February AFN Kaiserslautern went into operation."⁴¹

Personnel rotated in and out of the detachment after AFN Kaiserslautern went on the air. SGT Burke, CPLs Mangold, Lerner, and O'Keefe, and PFCs Martin and McCune left soon afterward. 2LT Shepard left as well, leaving 2LT Johnson as detachment commander.



Drafted in January 1951 from his foreman job at the Boston printing firm, Arcana Graphics, SSG Alphonse A. Principato, Reproduction Company, got to visit family and sightsee in Italy while on leave. Here he is photographed inside the Coliseum in Rome.

SGT Frank Frederick and two junior enlisted soldiers arrived to backfill some of the departed personnel. Despite personnel changeovers, the detachment relayed AFN for the next several months, thus providing the MRBC with a valuable training opportunity.⁴²

As the 301st RB&L companies trained for their wartime mission, the Group also launched public relations initiatives to build rapport with the local German population. For example, the unit ‘adopted’ children from nearby orphanages and allowed them to visit the Group facilities, particularly on special occasions. In December 1951, orphans from Weinheim joined the Group during its holiday festivities. The following year, HHC First Sergeant (1SG) Edward M. Morris and MRBC CPL John R. O’Keefe arranged for 27 children from the Pforzheim Orphanage to do the same. The RB&L gave the children toys, games, food, and other kinds of “common luxuries” enjoyed by American kids. COL McCulloch wrote that the latter initiative had helped “cement the friendship between the people of Pforzheim and vicinity and the Americans.”⁴³

The 301st RB&L also built relationships with other U.S. Army units in order to ‘sell’ them on Psywar. For example, one team consisting of 1LT Walter B. Ehr Gott, SSG Rudick, and a couple other enlisted men traveled around and touted Psywar as “the world’s second oldest profession.”⁴⁴ In September 1952 alone, teams traveled to Heidelberg, Munich, Frankfurt, Bonn, Berlin, and Paris, France, to “establish liaison with other organizations concerned with [Psywar] activities and to coordinate efforts along



SSG Robert R. Rudick (seated in background) “throws a cue” to voice actor CPL John R. O’Keefe (standing), while additional actors CPL Leonard T. Giarraputo and PFC Michael J. Stoppleman (seated in foreground, left to right) stand by. They were demonstrating a typical Psywar broadcast to troops stationed in Munich, Germany, 1952.



An unidentified MRBC soldier mans AFN Kaiserslautern, set up in January 1953 to relay AFN broadcasts emanating from Frankfurt. The MRBC detachment continued manning AFN Kaiserslautern after the May 1953 de-federalization of the 301st RB&L, during the brief existence of its replacement, the 7721st RB&L.

these lines.” To demonstrate Communist propaganda, the 301st showed *The Condemned Village*, an East German propaganda film, to U.S. Army units.⁴⁵

When not participating in these various training and public relations initiatives, soldiers could take leave and explore Europe. *Psyche*, the unit newsletter, asked readers: “What better time is there to see the wonders of the ‘Old World’ than now, when Uncle Sam is financing your journey?”⁴⁶ According to another edition, “Almost everybody took their leaves in foreign countries.”⁴⁷ COLs Gruber and McCulloch allowed fifteen percent of the unit to be on leave at a time.⁴⁸ SSG Rudick remembered, “Passes were written by the HHC. We were able to go anywhere, except for Soviet zones in Germany or Communist nations.”⁴⁹ When not on leave, soldiers spent their spare time in other ways.

301st RB&L members participated in many different ‘extracurricular’ activities. This included unit sports teams that competed against other U.S. military teams in Germany. Volunteers also contributed to *Psyche*, first published in December 1952. According to the first issue, “you can take the editors’ word that *Psyche* has the whole-hearted backing of such people as COL Frank A. McCulloch, CPT Parker Snow, 1LT Frederick C. Kendall, and everyone in Reproduction Company. To insure bigger and better editions, support is needed from other important people, like corporals, privates, and sergeants. And officers, too.”⁵⁰ Between training, public relations initiatives, extracurricular activities, and leave, the unit took advantage of its time in the FRG, which was rapidly drawing to a close.

In late 1952, personnel losses mounted as reservists reached the end of their service commitments and rotated stateside. For example, the MRBC had 49 assigned personnel on 1 March 1952; on 31 December it had 29.⁵¹ Replacements were limited because the 301st was a reserve T/D unit nearing the end of its federalization period. Not content to rely on the Army personnel pipeline, COL McCulloch requested replacements by name even though he knew that the unit was on its way out.⁵² One such individual was CPL Arthur K. Keurajian, former co-owner and operator of a Detroit-based lithographic plate business called Bunker Hill Litho. When the 1952 draftee was in basic training at Camp Pickett, Virginia, he was contacted by McCulloch, who arranged for his assignment to the Reproduction Company.⁵³

The trickle of qualified arrivals like Keurajian into the unit was ‘too little, too late.’ In May 1953, the 301st reverted to USAR control and was replaced by the USAREUR-created 7721st RB&L.⁵⁴ However, this de-federalization was an administrative paper drill since the unit did not physically go anywhere; remaining soldiers and equipment just transferred to the short-lived 7721st until they could be placed elsewhere. A unit on paper only, the 301st remained on USAR status in New York City until the April 1954 disbandment of the HHC.⁵⁵ This concluded the career of one of the U.S. Army strategic Psywar units in the early years of the Cold War.




This image from the Repro Company yearbook, *Peck's Bad Boys* (1952), shows process cameraman CPL Arthur K. Keurajian hard at work. COL McCulloch hired the former co-owner and operator of a Detroit-based lithographic plate business while the draftee was in basic training at Camp Pickett, Virginia.

This article has centered on the 301st RB&L, a EUCOM and USAREUR strategic Psywar asset from November 1951 to May 1953. Due to national policy, the Group was barred from sending leaflets and strategic radio broadcasts across the Iron Curtain. As explained by the Chief of Psychological Warfare in the Pentagon, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, “[W]e are not active [in the Psywar field] in Europe. It is a State Department activity there now and we support that to the extent that it is desirable for us to do so.”⁵⁶ However, the RB&L trained hard for its wartime role so that if “we’re called into action, we can thus do so with the least hesitancy,” according to McCulloch.⁵⁷

The 301st RB&L Group was unique for several reasons. First, as explained in Part I, it had origins in multiple New York-based reserve units activated in the late 1940s, notably an NBC-sponsored MRBC. Second, it was activated in October 1950, federalized in May 1951, and trained for six months at Fort Riley as part of a concerted U.S. Army effort to rebuild a moribund Psywar capability. Third, the Group had a unique assortment of personnel with diverse military, professional, and linguistic backgrounds. Finally, the 301st RB&L was the only federalized reserve Psywar unit and the only strategic Psywar unit in Europe in the early 1950s. While deployed, 301st members realized that the Cold War could soon turn hot in Europe, especially since, as CPL Alan E. Bandler (HHC) recalled, “other GIs were being killed in Korea.”⁵⁸ ▲

COL Frank A. McCulloch



COL Frank A. McCulloch had the appropriate leadership skills and knowledge of Psywar to succeed COL Ellsworth H. Gruber as commander of the 301st RB&L Group. During WWII, he commanded 2/135th Infantry, 34th ID. After the war he served in the G-2 Psywar Division, Army Field Forces, before attending the first Psywar Officers' Course at the Army General School, Fort Riley, Kansas, May-June 1951. In September 1951, he assumed command of the new Psywar Detachment, 5021st ASU, which became the carrier unit for the 6th RB&L, activated in early 1952. In March 1952, Major General Robert M. Montague, the EUCOM G-3, informed Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, Chief of Psywar in the Pentagon, that a Psychological Warfare Officer with the rank of colonel was needed to replace Gruber, who was scheduled for stateside rotation. "Career Management Division allows us to exercise considerable judgment in [officer] assignments," explained McClure, who selected then-LTC McCulloch. "In view of his broad training, extensive background, and intimate knowledge of the Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, [he] is highly suited for this requirement." McCulloch assumed command of the 301st RB&L on 11 September 1952.⁵⁹

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Piercing the Iron Curtain Sidebar

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Members of the MRBC Monitoring Section tune into Communist broadcasts, ready to record relevant information.



The 7721st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group

The May 1953 de-federalization of the reserve 301st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) forced U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) to resolve the issue of remaining 301st soldiers and equipment. On 14 May 1953, USAREUR Headquarters, Area Command (HACOM) issued General Order #22. That order set 20 May as the activation date for the 7721st RB&L, the strategic psychological warfare (Psywar) replacement for the 301st.¹ However, the 7721st was just a short-lived holding detachment that was deactivated in September 1953, closing out the Army strategic Psywar presence in Europe for years.

Upon activation, the 7721st RB&L was to organize according to the USAREUR-created Table of Distribution (T/D) 77-7721, which was modeled on existing T/Ds for RB&L Groups. Because the 301st had that structure, the 7721st did not have to re-organize. The 'newly formed' 7721st would occupy the former barracks of the 301st (Sullivan Barracks), with the exception of one MRB detachment situated at the Vogelweh Cantonment in Kaiserslautern



COL Frank A. McCulloch assumed command of the 301st RB&L in September 1952 and remained at the helm when on 20 May 1953 the 7721st RB&L replaced it. McCulloch lobbied USAREUR to maintain a strategic Psywar capability, but that faded away with the deactivation of the 7721st on 15 September 1953.

that was relaying American Forces Network broadcasts to soldiers under Western Area Command.²

On 1 June 1953, formal assignment of 301st personnel and property to the 7721st happened "smoothly and efficiently."³ COL Frank A. McCulloch, 301st RB&L commander from September 1952 to May 1953 who then became the 7721st RB&L commander, told his subordinates that only the Group number had changed. "Personnel, equipment, and the mission remain the same, and it is my earnest hope that the new Group will carry on in the old tradition, in spite of the change in designation."⁴ Soldiers noticed no difference in their day-to-day routines.

One soldier who served in both the 301st and 7721st RB&Ls was native Lithuanian Private First Class (PFC) Vytenis Telycenas. Drafted in 1952 while residing in Cleveland, Ohio, Telycenas took basic training at Fort Knox, Kentucky, before specializing in signal and radio communications. In late 1952, he reported to the 525th Military Intelligence Service Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He soon received orders to the 301st RB&L Monitoring Section. When the 301st 'became' the 7721st, Telycenas recalled that nothing changed: "Everybody kept doing the same jobs."⁵

The 7721st maintained the same research and training focus as the 301st, continuing some of the latter's projects. The Group printed *Propaganda Review*, a product initiated by the 301st months prior that offered a daily summary of broadcasts by Radios Moscow, Warsaw (Poland), Prague (Czechoslovakia), (East) Berlin, Brasov (Romania), and Bucharest (Romania). In addition, it produced *Propanol*, a monthly analysis of broadcasts intercepted from the Communist bloc. According to the unit newsletter, *Psyche*, the purpose of *Propanol* was "obtaining intelligence to oppose [Communist] propaganda." Monitors tuned in twenty-four hours a day to broadcasts from behind the Iron Curtain, recorded relevant broadcasts, and forwarded



Designed to provide intelligence to oppose Communist propaganda, *Propanol* was a monthly intelligence analysis of foreign broadcasts. These images were pulled from a 1953 edition of *Psyche* and depict the process of producing *Propanol*. (1) Monitors assigned to the MRBC tuned into foreign broadcasts around the clock. PFCs Vytenis Telycenas (front) and Dennis Burgess tune into 11.96 AM to hear Russian commentary. (2) Tape recordings of intercepted broadcasts then went for translation. An enlisted Russian linguist (front) translates Soviet broadcasts while 1LT Roy W. Nickerson waits to have his Romanian tape translated. (3) Translated tapes were transcribed. PFC Hans A. Deutsch (L) and PVT John Leffingwell (R) “pound out *Propanol* copy.” (4) The S-2 analyzes the typed-up broadcasts and reduces them to their most relevant points. (5) Final analytical touches and approval happen at the command group level just prior to official publication of *Propanol*.

them to linguists for translation. Translated tapes then went for transcription and finally to the S-2 for a “strategic analysis and forecast.”⁶

In June, the 7721st carried out other tasks besides *Propaganda Review* and *Propanol*. In coordination with the 5th Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, Seventh U.S. Army tactical Psywar asset in the FRG, the RB&L assembled a Psywar exhibition in Paris, France. The Group developed and printed a “Welcome to Europe” pamphlet. And it established internal German language and Psywar-specific courses. Meanwhile, the Group continued tracking the political environment in Europe. For example, the Italian desk monitored and reported on that country’s June 7 national election in which the Christian Democracy Party emerged victorious over leftist parties and other factions in parliament.⁷

Training activities continued throughout July. Several 7721st personnel attended an abbreviated Russian language course at the USAREUR Intelligence and Military Police School, roughly 250 miles south in Oberammergau. The

Group propagandists developed a hypothetical leaflet directed at civilians in a combat zone as well as foreign language radio scripts for a field exercise. USAREUR tasked the Group to prepare scripts and assign a scriptwriter and two announcers for the Fourth of July festivities in Heidelberg. Complementing these more specialized opportunities was refresher training on such military topics as Military Security and Customs and Courtesies.⁸

On 22 July 1953, COL McCulloch received verbal notification of the forthcoming deactivation of the unit in September, effectively ending training. “Selected operations of the Group were discontinued pending official orders,” which came about a month later.⁹ On 17 August, Headquarters, Area Command published General Order #38. The order directed that on 15 September the 7721st RB&L would be relieved from assignment to G-3, USAREUR; T/D 77-7721 would be withdrawn; and personnel would report to G-1, USAREUR for new assignments. PFC Telycenas recalled, “We were told to make some phone calls and



In addition to *Propanol*, the 7721st RB&L produced *Propaganda Review*, a daily translated summary of Communist news broadcasts, and *Psyche*, the unit newsletter containing world news and relevant information for the Group. Depicted here are the covers of the 10 July 1953 edition of *Propaganda Review* and the June 1953 issue of *Psyche*.

find another job, and that's what we did."¹⁰ "Common equipment" was to be turned in "in accordance with existing regulations," but "equipment peculiar to [Psywar] will be prepared for disposition in accordance with special instructions to be issued by Headquarters, USAREUR."¹¹


General Order #38 ended 7721st RB&L operations. COL McCulloch wanted the Army to keep a strategic Psywar presence in theater. He proposed that USAREUR delegate a "panel of officers and enlisted men" to stay behind for that purpose, which was accepted. Three officers and five soldiers gathered "selected records and equipment" of the 7721st and reported to G-3, USAREUR. However, there is no indication that anything came out of their efforts. By 15 September 1953, all of the RB&L equipment was turned in and personnel were reassigned. The next day, the 7721st submitted its last Morning Report, an anticlimactic finish to the U.S. Army strategic Psywar presence in Europe in the early 1950s.¹² ▲

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Skokoski's Journey

Service in Three WWII
Special Operations Units

by Troy J. Sacquety

The U.S. created a number of Special Operations units during World War II. While a few of them, such as the First Special Service Force, Merrill's Marauders, and elements of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) are well-known, others have slipped into anonymity. Even within the OSS, there are some units and projects that remain largely unknown. One OSS veteran, former Sergeant (SGT) Frank J. Skokoski, served in three obscure Special Operations elements in WWII. These units, BARDSEA, Operational Group ADRIAN, and the Special Allied Airborne Reconnaissance Force (SAARF), exemplified the inter-allied cooperation needed to rid Europe of Nazi domination. This article illustrates three main points. First, it provides snapshots of the unique units in which Skokoski served. Second, it describes some of the peripheral missions that Special Operations units assumed during WWII, even if they were never fully executed. Third, it emphasizes how, despite the best planning and preparation, the rapid development of events can render some Special Operations missions unnecessary.

Skokoski followed an indirect route into Special Operations. Born in 1924 in Hazelton, Pennsylvania, to Polish immigrants, Skokoski grew up speaking his parents' native language at home and English outside. A week after finishing high school in 1942, he enlisted in the U.S. Army.¹ His first assignment was as a medic in the 79th Infantry Division, but Skokoski did not find that duty very exciting. He volunteered for the paratroopers, admitting later that he did "not even know about the extra pay."² In August 1943, after completing the Basic Airborne Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, Private Skokoski received an assignment to the 541st Parachute Infantry Regiment at Camp Mackall, North Carolina. In December 1943, he participated in the Knollwood Maneuvers in North Carolina that tested the viability of a division-sized airborne force.³ Then, early in 1944, he left the 541st and deployed by ship to Northern Ireland as an airborne replacement.

The twenty-day voyage was not pleasant because German U-Boats still roamed the Atlantic and had sunk hundreds of Allied ships during the previous two years. As



Sergeant Frank J. Skokoski, right, a member of both the Special Operations (SO) and Operational Groups (OG) Branches of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), served in three special operations units in WWII.



Private Skokoski while at Camp MacKall, NC.




79th Infantry Division
SSI



541st Parachute
Infantry Regiment
Patch

German submarines, or *Unterseeboot*—shortened to U-Boat, preyed on Allied shipping throughout WWII. Early in the war, they were the biggest threat, sinking hundreds of Allied vessels.





The main body of the BARDSEA contingent were Polish soldiers that had escaped from the German occupation. Notice the distinct Polish beret and badge, collar insignia, and airborne wing.

Proposed OSS BARDSEA Area (inset) within the MONICA Area of Operations.



a counter-measure to torpedoes, Skokoski's ship zigzagged the entire way to Ireland. That resulted in a longer voyage through choppy North Atlantic seas that made many passengers seasick. The unappetizing fare on board compounded their misery. "They gave us horsemeat" to eat, remembered Skokoski.⁴

After safely arriving in Ireland and being sent to a replacement depot, Skokoski was surprised when he was approached by OSS recruiters who asked "Do you speak Polish?" Answering "yes," the recruiter then asked "How would you like to jump behind the lines?" After again answering in the affirmative, the OSS then tested Skokoski's language ability. "They took us to London where a whole bunch of [unifomed] English and Polish officers questioned you."⁵ The volunteers were told to converse completely in Polish. Those who passed the language test were accepted into the OSS Special Operations (SO) Branch, the element charged with conducting sabotage and providing liaison to resistance movements.⁶

The OSS needed Polish speakers because of a complicated geopolitical situation that had arisen in Europe after decades of German aggression. Although it emerged victorious from World War I, France lost a significant percentage of its working age male population to combat losses. Postwar France turned to immigration to keep its coal mining industry functioning. Seeking a better opportunity, thousands of Poles immigrated to work in the mines in northern France.

But, the post-World War I peace did not last. On 1 September 1939, Nazi Germany and its allies, the Soviet Union and the Slovak Republic, invaded Poland. The country fell in a month, but a Polish Government-in-Exile managed to flee to London, England. Then, on 10 May 1940, Germany attacked France. In six weeks, most of France was under German occupation.⁷

Thereafter, the Allies tried to regain contact with the continent so that they could foster intelligence networks and resistance elements. In late 1942, the Polish Government-in-Exile established clandestine contact with the Polish community living in north France. The nearly 200,000 Polish expatriates represented a potential source of friendly manpower that the Allies could not ignore.⁸

The British equivalent of the OSS, the Special Operations Executive (SOE) assumed the task of exploiting this human resource.⁹ SOE reasoned that it could organize the Poles in France into resistance cells. Code-named MONICA, SOE's plan called for recruiting 2,500 Polish cell leaders. The cell leaders would then each recruit "5 men sworn to take part in any task given to them." In theory, MONICA would result in a resistance movement of about 15,000 members centered on the towns of Armentieres, Bethune, Arras, Cambrai, Blanc, and Misseron.¹⁰ The Polish Government-in-Exile had overall authority for the project and conceptually hoped to have a division-sized resistance element in Northern France. This would augment the nearly 195,000 men that had escaped from German-occupied Poland and who were then fighting under British command.¹¹

In 1942, SOE and the Polish Government-in-Exile established the BARDSEA Project to help accomplish MONICA.¹² BARDSEA consisted of thirty teams (five or six men each) that were to function much like the more well-known Jedburgh Teams.¹³ The BARDSEA teams would help train and arm the activated Polish resistance in France, ambush targets of opportunity, and serve as a communications link between the local MONICA cells and SOE.¹⁴

However, the Polish Government-in-Exile, given overall authority as to when to implement BARDSEA, proved reluctant to insert the teams. The London Poles correctly reasoned that if the French Poles began conducting overt resistance acts too early, they would become easy targets for German reprisals. Therefore, the Polish Government-in-Exile decided that it would only commit the BARDSEA units when conventional Allied forces could reach the teams in less than 72 hours.¹⁵

The OSS became involved in the project in early 1944 when the command and control of OSS SO and SOE operations in northwest Europe were integrated under the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEPF). The OSS SO Branch provided fourteen personnel to BARDSEA.¹⁶ Supplemented with one Polish radio operator, the OSS BARDSEA contingent was divided into three five-man elements, designated as the DODFORD, DUNCHURCH, and DACHET Groups. Skokoski was assigned to DACHET.¹⁷

SOE had overall responsibility for the BARDSEA training program, but the Polish Government-in-Exile supplied some of the instructors. First, the OSS contingent went through British airborne training, which included a parachute jump from a tethered balloon.¹⁸ This was finished by the end of April 1944, after which the Americans trained with the entire BARDSEA contingent.¹⁹ Skokoski recalled that the BARDSEA personnel trained in demolitions, communications, how to operate German weapons, and studied French geography. A four-week portion of their program showed that the BARDSEA contingent trained

in weapons, compass and map reading, Morse code, and parachute techniques.²⁰ When the Normandy Invasion occurred on 6 June 1944, Skokoski thought that "it won't be long till we go over."²¹

However, team DACHET did not deploy. The mission was scrubbed only four hours before its scheduled launch in early September.²² SGT Skokoski recalled that "We were ready to go, but it started raining real hard, so they canceled it. It was that close."²³ According to a later report, "the extremely swift advance of the Allied Armies in France and the Low Countries towards the German frontier rendered the [BARDSEA] operation purposeless."²⁴ This was the first time in Skokoski's brief service that successful conventional operations rendered his special operations mission unnecessary. Despite the cancellation, the OSS was reluctant to give trained operatives back to the Army. The SO Branch transferred SGT Skokoski and the majority of the OSS BARDSEA contingent to the Operational Groups (OG) Branch.

Although composed almost entirely of detailed U.S. Army personnel, and the most Army-like of all the OSS Branches, the OGs were not a U.S. Army element. The OG Branch served as a "separate military unit within OSS of organized uniformed commandos or guerrilla troops who were experienced in and spoke the language of their target territory."²⁵ In contrast to the much-smaller SO teams, OG teams served as separate uniformed military elements capable of acting with or independently of guerrilla/resistance forces.


On paper, an OG group consisted of thirty-four men composed of four officers and thirty enlisted men.²⁶ However in practice, the group typically split into two sections of fifteen men (two officers and thirteen enlisted). The section could be further divided into two squads if needed.²⁷ According to historian Alfred H. Paddock, early Special Forces modeled its "organization, training, and job description," after those of the OGs.²⁸



The BARDSEA operation was comprised of British, Polish, and American personnel organized into thirty, five-to-six-man teams. Here is the entire contingent in formation.



All operational elements under SFHQ wore the Special Force wing. This included BARDSEA, the Jedburghs, and the OGs.




The OSS BARDSEA contingent as it is awarded the Polish airborne wings and certificate. SGT Skokoski is second from right.



The award document for the Polish airborne wings along with the badge.



BARDSEA personnel, likely the OSS contingent, practice with their weapons in the field. The soldier on the left uses an OSS-issue 9mm United Defense M42 while the one on the right has a 30.06 Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR).



This is the entire OSS BARDSEA contingent along with two Polish personnel and one other. At only fourteen personnel, the U.S. contribution was augmented with Poles.




BARDSEA personnel practice fire and maneuver. Notice the signal smoke at the right of the photo and the 'umpire' in the right front.

Operational Groups Branch

THE OPERATIONAL GROUP IS THE BASIC FIELD UNIT

Each group must be self-sufficient because operations are aimed at special isolated objectives. Further decentralization within the group command is also necessary because component parts may have to split from their group, each to organize, train, or take command of a different native force.

Each section and each squad is capable of independent action. The smaller the unit, the more mobile and inconspicuous, two leading requirements in operations conducted behind enemy lines and in constant danger of separation from a base or supporting forces.



OSS chief Major General William J. Donovan believed that America's 'melting-pot' provided an ideal source of soldiers with language and cultural skills. After rigorous training in Unconventional Warfare, these soldiers of the Operational Groups (OG) Branch were inserted as teams into enemy-occupied territory.¹ Their mission was to "organize, train, and equip resistance groups in order to convert them into guerrillas, and to serve as the nuclei of such groups in operations against the enemy as directed by the theater commander."² A typical OG was comprised of four officers and thirty enlisted men. However, they often operated independently in sections half that size.³


Doctrinally, the OGs also made an impact. Colonel Russell W. Volckmann used the OG model when he wrote Department of the Army Field Manual FM 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerilla Warfare*, the Army's first manual for the operation and

employment of Special Forces in guerrilla warfare. "Operational Groups" would be "composed of specially qualified military personnel, in uniform, organized, trained, and equipped to operate as teams within enemy territory."⁴ These self-sustaining elements would take "enough equipment and supplies to maintain themselves and to establish communication nets within their projected area of operations."⁵ Once infiltrated into enemy-occupied territory, they would operate just like the OGs had done in WWII.⁶

The OGs left a lasting legacy. Although not a U.S. Army unit, OG sections provided an organizational and functional model for early Operational Detachment A Teams (ODAs) when Special Forces was created in 1952. As historian Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. relates: "In terms of organization, training, and job description, the OGs presaged the basic operational detachment adopted by the Army's 10th Special Forces Group on its creation in 1952."⁷

Special Operations Branch and Operations In France

SO/OSS European Theater, June 1944



In January 1944, the OSS Special Operations (SO) Branch integrated with SOE as a “full partner”¹ The combined organization, designated as the Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ), had responsibility for “coordinating all underground resistance in France in direct support of the forthcoming Allied invasion.”² It was placed under the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).

Including BARDSEA, SO supported other projects. It provided personnel to SOE ‘circuits,’ that established and organized cells to supply, train, and direct resistance forces.³ The circuits paved the way for other elements to follow, such as the JEDBURGH teams, a joint and combined Allied program with personnel from SO, SOE, and the French *Bureau Central de Renseignements et d’Action*. In total, 103 French, 90 British, 83 American, 5 Belgian, and 5 Dutch personnel served on ninety-three JEDBURGH teams that parachuted into France and eight in the Netherlands.⁴ The

JEDBURGHs helped organize and arm the resistance, arranged supply drops, procured intelligence, provided liaison between the Allies and the Resistance, and took part in sabotage operations.⁵ Ideally, teams consisted of one French, one British, and one U.S. soldier, but in practice the only consistency among each two-to-four-man team was an officer and a radio operator. SO also supported Inter-Allied missions which worked at a higher political level among the French Resistance than the JEDBURGHs.

In addition, Special Force Detachments served at the Army-level attached to the G-3. They advised conventional forces on the utility of the resistance; provided intelligence; served as the conduit to SFHQ for intelligence requests or aid to the resistance; and recovered agents or OSS personnel whose area of operations had been overtaken by the conventional forces.⁶ They served as the rough equivalent of today’s Operational Detachment ‘C’ Teams.

The OGs were active in combat operations in German-occupied France beginning on 9 June 1944.²⁹ Skokoski became a member of ADRIAN, which parachuted into France on 9 September 1944. As such, ADRIAN was the last OG mission inserted into France. By then, the section discovered that the strategic situation in France had drastically changed since early June.

Following the Allied landings in Normandy (6 June 1944) and Southern France (15 August 1944), German forces struggled to hold France. Unable to halt or contain the Allied forces, the largely non-motorized German military withdrew slowly towards their border to regroup and form defensive positions. Meanwhile, mechanized spearheads from the two Allied invasion forces raced to meet at Dijon to cut off the retreating German forces. This pincer formed a bottleneck that channeled retreating Germans. Therefore, unlike most of the OG and Jedburgh missions dispatched to France to harass German forces trying to stem the Allied advance, ADRIAN's mission was to target retreating enemy forces to prevent their escape.³⁰

Because of the rapidly developing tactical situation, the OG Command quickly brought each team "up to maximum strength by the addition of any O.G. personnel left" in the UK.³¹ For ADRIAN, this meant that men from the Norwegian OG contingent training in the UK were added to the former BARDSEA personnel.³² ADRIAN was an *ad hoc* element with thirteen officers and eighteen enlisted men, and did not resemble the size or structure of a standard OG.

ADRIAN's mission was to support the efforts of OG mission CHRISTOPHER and Jedburgh team DESMOND that had been dropped together into the Poitiers area on the night of 3 September 1944.³³ DESMOND was a three-man element led by Captain (CPT) William H. Pietsch, Jr., with the mission of establishing contact and liaison with the French Resistance.³⁴ CHRISTOPHER was a fifty-seven man element led by CPT Melvin J. Hjeltness. It had the mission of harassing, "or, if possible, stopping," German

forces from retreating through the area.³⁵ Like ADRIAN, CHRISTOPHER was also task organized and composed of men from different groups, in this case the French and Norwegian OGs. Unknown to the men of ADRIAN, there were already problems in the field.

Prior to insertion, team DESMOND was placed under the command of the commanding officer of CHRISTOPHER.³⁶ DESMOND's mission was to make contact with the resistance and recommend courses of action for CHRISTOPHER. CHRISTOPHER, however, was under no obligation to accept or act on that advice.³⁷ This arrangement did not work in the field.

Once on the ground, DESMOND contacted the French Resistance. CPT Pietsch told its leader, using the *nom de guerre* of 'Colonel Claude,' that the OGs were not "organized as an infantry unit" and as such "were to be used for hit and run work." However, Colonel Claude wished to use the OGs to showcase the presence of uniformed U.S. soldiers because the "Germans would surrender to Regular soldiers," vice the Resistance.³⁸ In effect, CHRISTOPHER allowed itself to be subordinated to DESMOND. These orders reflected the desires of the French Resistance, and were not conducive to OG combat operations. After missing several opportunities to attack the Germans while they waited on CPT Pietsch to organize transportation and supporting forces, CHRISTOPHER's officers "decided all this chasing around was getting them nowhere," and took the operational initiative.³⁹ By the time ADRIAN inserted, the other two OSS elements were barely coexisting together.

On the night of 9 September Skokoski and his thirty-one-man OG team boarded seven B-24 Liberator bombers modified for parachute operations.⁴⁰ ADRIAN was inserted into the Cotes D'Or area, about 35 kilometers northwest of Dijon.⁴¹ The first plane started dropping ADRIAN at 2345 hours, and finished at 0100.⁴² However, not all went according to plan.

The day after their parachute insertions into France, the men of OG CHRISTOPHER ready for operations in the village of Is Sur Tille.





OG Team ADRIAN prepares to jump into Northern France. SGT Skokoski is on the left.



OG ADRIAN utilized numerous pieces of British equipment, including parachutes, helmets, and Dennison jump smocks.



A close up shot of the British parachute used by OG ADRIAN. Unlike U.S. parachutes, the British ones featured a harness quick release in the front. No reserve chutes were worn.



This photograph of OG ADRIAN illustrates the kind of insignia worn. Under and over the SF wing are U.S. flags to identify the team clearly as American personnel. In order to be treated as combatants if captured, OG personnel always wore uniforms in the field.

At 55 men, Operational Group CHRISTOPER was one of the largest OGs employed in the field. Here, about half of the group poses on 4 September 1944, the morning after their parachute jump into German-occupied France.



The first member through the B-24 Liberator 'joe hole' (bottom machine gun ball turret removed) was the commanding officer of ADRIAN, CPT Joseph J. Kielbowicz. While under canopy, CPT Kielbowicz was killed instantly by a falling supply canister. ADRIAN reported: "Capt Kilbowicz [sic] jumping first out of number one plane was struck in mid air by container filled with mortar shells. Mortars exploded and caught [the] container and his chute on fire."⁴³ In addition, First Lieutenant Stanley Konieczka suffered a broken foot,




Captain Joseph J. Kielbowicz, center, was the commanding officer of OG ADRIAN. He was killed during his combat jump when a container struck him in mid-air.

Second Lieutenant John W. Haag a sprained knee and pulled muscle, and Staff Sergeant Edmond S. Porado two sprained knees.⁴⁴

ADRIAN's mission was not well-coordinated. It appears that neither DESMOND nor CHRISTOPHER knew that ADRIAN was scheduled to join them.⁴⁵ They expected a supply drop, not another OG. The command and control problems on the ground were compounded by the death of CPT Kielbowicz. CPT Orleans A. Pitre, a last-minute addition who was only supposed to "act as an observer for the group," but "not to be officially attached to it," reluctantly assumed command of ADRIAN.⁴⁶ Since their radios were smashed in the drop, ADRIAN communicated through the radio operator assigned to DESMOND.

Like CHRISTOPHER, ADRIAN was instructed by HQ to cooperate with DESMOND but that it was to "remain under the direct command of headquarters."⁴⁷ On 10 September, CPT Pietsch of DESMOND met with CPT Pitre to share intelligence. CPT Pietsch told ADRIAN to "organize its operations as they saw fit."⁴⁸

On that same day, Major (MAJ) Gerald W. Davis of Special Force Detachment #11 also met with CPT Pitre. OSS Special Force Detachments were assigned to the Army level to conduct liaison between resistance movements, OSS missions with the conventional forces, and to recover OSS personnel once their areas had been taken by regular forces. MAJ Davis asked ADRIAN to "patrol the road Pellerey/Is-Aur-Tille [sic] until bypassed by the Seventh Army." In addition, MAJ Davis instructed CPT Pitre to "join his group with Group [CHRISTOPHER] and to take charge of the whole group."



Area where ADRIAN and French Resistance ambushed retreating German troops just ahead of the 7th U.S. Army.





Is-sur-Tille, France.

Confusion plagued Command and Control on the ground. CPT Hjeltness (CHRISTOPHER) refused to subordinate his command because he “had been given charge of his group from London and decided not to relinquish this command until receiving further orders. At a meeting that night of 10 September, all the officers of OG [CHRISTOPHER] decided to carry on their operations alone under Captain Hjeltness’ direction.”⁴⁹ CPT Pitre, like the commander of CHRISTOPHER, decided it would be better to “work with his group as a separate unit.”⁵⁰

Fortunately, ADRIAN landed thirty miles in front of the U.S. Seventh Army in an area with a lot of French Resistance to provide security and knowledge of the enemy dispositions. Their movements were relatively safe. After meeting with local resistance leaders, CPT Pitre moved the OG into an ambush position. Their targets were elements of two enemy divisions retreating through the area. They were “all that remained of the [German] occupation forces of southern France.”⁵¹ At this point, ADRIAN got lucky.

Led by a light armored car, four large trucks filled with German troops entered the ambush zone. Two American Second Lieutenants (2LT), Edward A. Provost and Reed Pelfrey, used a bazooka to trigger the ambush. They stopped the armored car with the first round and the rest of the column halted in the kill zone. Skokoski and Team ADRIAN fired at will, killing or wounding up to 200 German troops. The approach of a second enemy convoy forced the OG to withdraw before they could search the vehicles or verify the extent of the damage. ADRIAN decided to melt back into the countryside rather than engage any reinforcements without the element of surprise.⁵²

ADRIAN soon enjoyed more success, although the stakes were smaller. A group of British Special Air Service (SAS) troops operating in the area told the OGs that the Germans were evacuating Dijon.⁵³ ADRIAN, reinforced by French Resistance members, ambushed a number of German troops on the Dijon to Is-sur-Tille road. They succeeded in “killing a considerable number.”⁵⁴ The next



This Bill Mauldin cartoon depicts the reality that many OG teams faced in France. German troops were far more willing to surrender to American troops than to the French Resistance, for fear of reprisals. Copyright by Bill Mauldin (1944). Courtesy of Bill Mauldin Estate LLC.

day a third ambush destroyed three vehicles at Courtivron and killed about ten German troops.⁵⁵ But, it was not all combat for ADRIAN.

They got to experience some French hospitality. On 13 September as the “First American troops to enter Couutirvon [*sic*] and Posjieu [probably Poiseal-les-Saulx] this morning. [They were] greeted with cheers, kisses, and flowers.”⁵⁶ ADRIAN’s four-day war was over because they were uncovered by conventional forces.

French troops had bypassed Dijon and no more Germans remained in ADRIAN’s operating area. The French 1st Armored Division liberated Dijon on 10 September.⁵⁷ It was also near Dijon that the U.S. Third and Seventh Armies met to link the invasion forces from Normandy and Southern France.⁵⁸ Its mission over, ADRIAN made its way to Paris. There, CPT Pitre reported to the OSS Special Force Detachment #12, with the U.S. Ninth Army. By 20 September, Skokoski and the rest of ADRIAN were back in the UK.⁵⁹ Lacking further opportunities in Europe, the OSS shipped the Polish-speaking men of OG ADRIAN to the United States.

Once back home the OSS sent the soldiers to Area F, the Congressional Country Club in Bethesda, Maryland. It was where the majority of OG personnel had trained prior to going overseas.⁶⁰ The OSS held the OGs at Area F while they decided what to do with them. Like many who had served in France, Skokoski recalled that he thought he would be sent to the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater.⁶¹ However the OSS asked him and three other Polish speakers if they would like to go back to England.⁶² All agreed.


When they got to England, the OSS men were told their assignment. Skokoski was to become part of the short-lived Special Allied Airborne Reconnaissance Force (SAARF), a relief effort to protect and mitigate the conditions of Allied Prisoners of War (POW) in German camps.⁶³ Activated in March 1945 by SHAEF and headquartered in Wentworth, England, SAARF was a task-organized multinational unit commanded by British Brigadier General John S. Nichols.⁶⁴ In the waning days of the war in Europe, SHAEF wanted a unit capable of acting in the event that the Germans decided to take reprisals against Allied Prisoners of War (POW) before they could be liberated. SAARF teams were



OG team ADRIAN, like these men from OG CHRISTOPHER, reported to Paris prior to being sent back to England.



A halftrack from a French armored division passes OG troops near Dijon. With the arrival of the French conventional forces, the OSS mission was over.



During WWII, the Congressional Country Club in Bethesda, Maryland, was leased to the OSS as a training area for the OGs. This booklet gave new arrivals a brief look at the training area.



This photo details part of the multi-national makeup of SAARF. From left to right are French, U.S., and Polish personnel. The U.S. personnel wear the SAARF wing on their lower right sleeve.



SAARF Wing



SAARF Tab



SHAEF SSI

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
 COPY NO. 9
 25 APR 45
 DATE

To Whom It May Concern:

1. The bearer of this letter, further identified by personal identification tags or documents is: MEERMAN William A. Lieut 0-1296276
 (Last Name) (First Name) (Middle Initial) (Rank) (Number)

of the regularly constituted military forces of United States
 (Allied Country)

and a member of the Special Allied Airborne Reconnaissance Force, operating directly under this headquarters.

2. The mission of this individual is in connection with Allied Prisoners of War now in GERMANY. He comes to determine whether those who have such prisoners under restraint or control, are fulfilling their obligations under the Geneva Convention. In an emergency he is prepared to call for aid in obtaining food and medical supplies as required for their maintenance and well being and has facilities for establishing contact with Allied Agencies for that purpose.

3. All are enjoined to render such assistance to this individual and his party as may be necessary in the fulfillment of this mission, and to facilitate his return to his proper location.

By direction of the Supreme Commander:

Signature of Individual:
William A. Meerman

Issued by:
J. J. Davis

Special Allied Airborne Recon. Force

J. J. DAVIS
 Brigadier General, USA
 Adjutant General

The SAARF teams carried a letter, printed on one side in English and German on the other. The letter identified the individual and his mission and asked the reader to provide assistance.

to parachute near POW camps, establish contact with the German guard personnel and advise them not to harm the Allied prisoners. Then the teams would provide for the medical and nutritional needs of the prisoners after radioing for air-drop supplies.

The three-man SAARF teams consisted of two officers and an enlisted radio operator. Initial plans were to form 120 teams made up of British, American, French, Belgian, and Polish soldiers.⁶⁵ The use of multiple Allied contingents meant that they could deal with the different nationalities in the camps. But, unlike the combined Jedburgh teams, the three man SAARF teams were composed of soldiers from a single country. The majority of the American personnel came from U.S. Army Airborne units and the OSS.

Since the SAARF teams were formed rapidly to meet the emerging requirement, the soldiers had little time to train. Those few who were not already parachute-qualified attended British airborne school. However, since the OSS contingent were already airborne qualified, Skokoski recalled that "There wasn't much training." Instead, the contingent exercised to keep fit.⁶⁶

The first six SAARF teams parachuted near Altengrabow, Germany, on 25 April 1945 as Operation VIOLET. Their mission was to assist in the liberation of Stalag XI-A. VIOLET was SAARF's only airborne operation, and the last parachute jump of the war in Europe, since the Germans surrendered on 8 May. Other SAARF teams were individually assigned to the U.S. Seventh Army, 6th Army Group, 12th Army Group, and 21st Army Group (British), but all entered their operational areas by vehicle.⁶⁷

Once the SAARF teams contacted the German guards or Allied POWs, they established a 'baseline' of camp conditions. SAARF personnel estimated the requirement for medical or food supplies and verified the number of prisoners of each nationality at each camp. Then, because of their proximity, conventional Allied land forces supported the POW needs until the camps were under Allied control. Afterwards, the SAARF teams assisted in evacuating the Western POWs (U.S., UK, France, Netherlands, Belgium, etc.). Per prior agreement, POWs from the Soviet Union, Poland, or Italy were often turned over to the Soviets for final disposition. SAARF teams also performed another important, if unforeseen, function: interviewing POWs to uncover Germans masquerading as prisoners looking to escape.

The collapse of German resistance, along with the SHAEF decision to disband the unit rather than send it to the Far East, limited the SAARF potential. It disbanded on 1 July 1945.⁶⁸ For the third time, the advancing conventional forces rendered Skokoski's special operations mission unnecessary. For his part, Skokoski never deployed with a SAARF team and returned to the United States on 30 May 1945.⁶⁹ Following his discharge at the Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pennsylvania, former SGT Frank Skokoski went home to Hazelton, PA, to marry and raise a family.⁷⁰

The three special operations units that Skokoski served in quickly became footnotes in history. In each case, the rapid advance of conventional forces in the European



The British SAARF contingent.

Theater shortened their planned operational window. Skokoski's war is a reminder of just how connected special operations are, and should be, to the actions of conventional forces. Nonetheless, the special operations units in which Skokoski served represented the type of contingencies that the OSS prepared to execute and are evidence of the broad range of missions that were accepted in the war. As such, their missions and accomplishments are worth remembering as part of the rich heritage of today's modern special operations forces. ♣

Thanks to the Skokoski family, Dr. Stephen Kippax, Dr. Jonathan Clemente, and Mr. Les Hughes.

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Endnotes

- 1 Frank Skokoski, interview by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 28 October 2008, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC., hereafter Skokoski interview.
- 2 Skokoski interview.
- 3 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Biographies," p. 255, Roll 10, Target 3, Vol II, M1623, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), 255; for more on the **Knollwood Maneuvers**, see Eugene Piasecki, "The Knollwood Maneuver: The Ultimate Airborne Test," *Veritas* 4:1 (2008), 54–63.
- 4 Skokoski interview.
- 5 Skokoski interview.
- 6 Kermit Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS Volume II* (New York: Walker and Company, 1976), 206.
- 7 **According to the terms of the 22 June 1940 Armistice, all of northern France and the Atlantic Coastline was placed under German control. A collaborator and ostensibly neutral French government controlled the rest of France and the colonies that did not side with the separate Free French. With the Allied invasion of North Africa, the Germans occupied the rest of France (Vichy France) on 8–11 November 1942.**
- 8 *OSS Aid to the French Resistance in World War II*, "Poles in France Used by the Resistance," Folder 15, Box 8, Ian Sutherland Collection, History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC. **The Polish living in France were organized under the organization code-named MONICA.**
- 9 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch (DF-Section): West Europe," p. 129, Roll 7, Target 8, Book XIII, M1623, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD.
- 10 *OSS Aid to the French Resistance in World War II*, "Poles in France Used by the Resistance."
- 11 **Significant numbers of Poles managed to avoid capture by the Germans and fought alongside the Western forces. In addition to a small navy and air force, the Polish ground forces included the Polish 1st Armored Division that saw critical service at Normandy by helping to close the Falaise Pocket. Another is the Polish Independent Parachute Brigade, badly mauled during Operation MARKET GARDEN.**
- 12 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch (DF-Section): West Europe: Poles in France," p. 126–27, Roll 7, Target 8, Book XIII, M1623, NARA. **By contrast, the plan to use Poles throughout France was called ANGELICA.**
- 13 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch (DF-Section): West Europe: Poles in France," p. 139, Roll 7, Target 8, Book XIII, M1623, NARA.
- 14 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch (DF-Section): West Europe: Poles in France," p. 127–130, Roll 7, Target 8, Book XIII, M1623, NARA.
- 15 *OSS Aid to the French Resistance in World War II*, "Poles in France Used by the Resistance."
- 16 *OSS Aid to the French Resistance in World War II*, "Poles in France Used by the Resistance." **Per "Part I Orders (Students)," 26 March 1944, Poland 153, S.O.E, HS4/228, National Archives (UK), London, England, the OSS assigned three naval personnel to BARDSEA on 6 March 1944 and eleven from the Army on 21 March 1944.**
- 17 "BARDSEA Groups," 29 August 1944, HS4-227 "Poland BARDSEA Personnel and reports," National Archives (UK),
- 18 **The BARDSEA Groups used British equipment. Unlike the U.S., the British did not use a reserve parachute. The OSS contingent was awarded both the British and Polish airborne insignia.**
- 19 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Operational Groups," p. 6, Roll 9, Target 1, Volume 4-A, M1623, NARA.
- 20 "Block Programme (4 Weeks)," March 1944, HS4-227 "Poland BARDSEA Personnel and reports," National Archives (UK).
- 21 Skokoski interview.
- 22 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch (DF-Section): West Europe: Poles in France," p. 141A, Roll 7, Target 8, Book XIII, M1623, NARA.
- 23 Skokoski interview.
- 24 Mikolajczyk to Lord Selborne, "My Dear Lord Selborne," 5 September 1944, HS4-229, S.O.E. Poland 154, BARSEA (*sic*) Polish Plan for France Reports and Training, National Archives (UK).
- 25 Secretariat, Strategic Services Unit, War Department, "The Office of Strategic Services On VE Day—VJ Day," 11 March 1946, released by the Central Intelligence Agency, found on the internet at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIA-RDP80R0173R003600080001-8.pdf, accessed 17 September 2014.
- 26 OSS, "Operational Groups Field Manual-Strategic Services (Provisional)," 25 April 1944, p. 6, Folder 4, Box 128, Entry 99, Research Group 226, NARA.
- 27 Office of Strategic Services, OG: *Operational Group Command* (Washington DC, OSS, 1944); Alfred T. Cox, *Operational Report: Company "B" 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion Separate (Prov.)*, (Grenoble, France, 20 September 1944), 1; OG TO&E found in Folder 52, Box 12, Ian Sutherland Collection, History Support Center, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Caesar J. Civitella, interviewed by Dr. Troy J. Sacquety, 9 September, 2013, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 28 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 35.
- 29 **The first of thirteen North Africa-based sections, code-named EMILY, parachuted near Limoges early in the morning of 9 June 1944. Another eight OG sections jumped into France from England.**
- 30 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Operational Groups," (ADRIAN Operational Report), p. 138, Roll 9, Target 1, Volume 4-A, M1623, NARA.

- 31 "E.M.F.F.I. Operation Order No. 45," 1 September 1944, Folder 31 OG Teams "CHRISTOPHER" and "DESMOND" Ops Plans and Reports, Box 7, Ian Sutherland Collection, History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 32 **ADRIAN has the distinction of being the only OG with Navy personnel.** Both Raymond J. Filipkoski and Adolph R. Nowalowski were sailors recruited into the BARDEA program. Ordinarily, the OGs only recruited from the U.S. Army. The Norwegians were also training in the UK.
- 33 "Report of Jedburgh Mission-DESMOND," and "Report of Operational Group CHRISTOPHER," both located in "OG Teams Christopher and Desmond, Op Plans and Reports," Folder 31, Box 7, Ian Sutherland Collection, USASOC History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 34 "E.M.F.F.I. O.G. Operation Brief No. 6," 1 September 1944, Folder 31 OG Teams "CHRISTOPHER" and "DESMOND" Ops Plans and Reports, Box 7, Ian Sutherland Collection, History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 35 "E.M.F.F.I. O.G. Operation Brief No. 6," 1 September 1944, Folder 31 OG Teams "CHRISTOPHER" and "DESMOND" Ops Plans and Reports, Box 7, Ian Sutherland Collection, History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 36 "E.M.F.F.I. Operation Order No. 45," 1 September 1944, Folder 31 OG Teams "CHRISTOPHER" and "DESMOND" Ops Plans and Reports, Box 7, Ian Sutherland Collection, History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC. **CHRISTOPHER was under the direct command of and reported to the Etat Major, Forces Francaises de l'Interieur (EMFFI—a tripartite staff of French/British/Americans within Special Force Headquarters in London).**
- 37 "Report of Jedburgh Mission-DESMOND," 1., located in "OG Teams Christopher and Desmond, Op Plans and Reports," Folder 31, Box 7, Ian Sutherland Collection, USASOC History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 38 "Report of Jedburgh Mission-DESMOND," 4., located in "OG Teams Christopher and Desmond, Op Plans and Reports," Folder 31, Box 7, Ian Sutherland Collection, USASOC History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 39 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Operational Groups," see "Operations, OG CHRISTOPHER," p. 124, Roll 9, Target 1, Volume 4-A, M1623, NARA.
- 40 "Allocation of Personnel, Containers and Packages," [September 1944], Ian Sutherland Collection, Folder OSS Europe Jedburgh Team "Adrian" Air Supply Support Personnel and Equipment, Box 7, USASOC History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC. **The B-24s were from the 'Carpetbaggers' of the 492nd Bombardment Group (Heavy). A TO&E OG was 32 men that could be further split into two sections. However, most deployed as sections, not as entire OGs. At 31 men, OG ADRIAN was one of the largest OG missions to go into German-occupied France. It did not resemble the normal mix of officers and enlisted men, such as the OG sections parachuted into France from North Africa.**
- 41 *OSS London War Diary*, "Operational Groups," p. 138-140, Roll 9, Volume 4A, M1623, NARA.
- 42 "Data from original mission reports, microfilm roll A5688, participants and researchers-September 1944," found on the internet at <http://www.801492.org/Agents/09-JoesAll44.htm>, accessed 9 September 2013.
- 43 "From ADRIAN," 12 September 1944, in "ETO ADRIAN," contained in Ian Sutherland Collection, Folder OSS Europe Jedburgh Team "Adrian" Mission Report, Message Traffic, Box 7, USASOC History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 44 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Operational Groups," see "Operations, OG ADRIAN," p. 141, Roll 9, Target 1, Volume 4-A, M1623, NARA.
- 45 "Report of Jedburgh Mission-DESMOND," 12., located in "OG Teams Christopher and Desmond, Op Plans and Reports," Folder 31, Box 7, Ian Sutherland Collection, USASOC History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 46 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Operational Groups," see "Operations, OG ADRIAN," p. 140, Roll 9, Target 1, Volume 4-A, M1623, NARA.
- 47 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Operational Groups," see "Operations, OG ADRIAN," p. 139, Roll 9, Target 1, Volume 4-A, M1623, NARA.
- 48 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Operational Groups," see "Operations, OG ADRIAN," p. 141, Roll 9, Target 1, Volume 4-A, M1623, NARA.
- 49 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Operational Groups," see "Operations, OG CHRISTOPHER," p. 128-129, Roll 9, Target 1, Volume 4-A, M1623, NARA.
- 50 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Operational Groups," see "Operations, OG CHRISTOPHER," p. 129, Roll 9, Target 1, Volume 4-A, M1623, NARA.
- 51 William D. Goddard, ed., *Report of Operations: The Seventh United States Army in France and Germany 1944-1945* [Germany, 1947?], 252.
- 52 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Operational Groups," see "Operations, OG ADRIAN," p. 142, Roll 9, Target 1, Volume 4-A, M1623, NARA.
- 53 **An SAS group was the British equivalent of an OG. Having been cross trained and instructed in parachute and amphibious insertions generally made the OGs more versatile.** Thanks to UK researcher Stephen Kippax.
- 54 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Operational Groups," see "Operations, OG ADRIAN," p. 142, Roll 9, Target 1, Volume 4-A, M1623, NARA.
- 55 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Operational Groups," see "Operations, OG ADRIAN," p. 143, Roll 9, Target 1, Volume 4-A, M1623, NARA.
- 56 "From ADRIAN," 13 September 1944, in "ETO ADRIAN," contained in Ian Sutherland Collection, Folder OSS Europe Jedburgh Team "Adrian" Mission Report, Message Traffic, Box 7, USASOC History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 57 William D. Goddard, ed., *Report of Operations: The Seventh United States Army in France and Germany 1944-1945* [Germany, 1947?], 271.
- 58 Goddard, ed., *Report of Operations: The Seventh United States Army in France and Germany 1944-1945*, 271.
- 59 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Operational Groups," see "Operations, OG ADRIAN," p. 143, Roll 9, Target 1, Volume 4-A, M1623, NARA.
- 60 For more on the OSS training areas, read John W. Chambers II, *OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad In World War II*, (Washington DC: U.S. National Park Service, 2008), found on the internet at http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/oss/index.htm, accessed 6 August 2013.
- 61 The majority of the French OG personnel went to China to train Chinese Airborne units known as the Chinese Commandos. Some Greek, Norwegian, and Arakan Field Unit (Southern Burma) OG personnel also served in that mission.
- 62 Skokoski interview.
- 63 **SAARF went under the code-named Operation VICARAGE.**
- 64 Kermit Roosevelt, *The Overseas Targets: War Report of the OSS Volume II* (Washington DC: Carrollton Press, 1976), 352; W.B. Smith to J.S. Nichols, "Airborne contact and reconnaissance teams," 21 March 1945, Ian Sutherland Collection, Box 7, Folder "Vicarge" Mission Evacuation of Allied POWs by Recon Teams, USASOC History Support Center, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 65 SHAEF FWD to EXFOR MAIN, 24 April 1945, Folder 322, Box 38, Entry 1, Research Group 331, NARA.
- 66 Skokoski interview.
- 67 "SAARF Progress Report," 3 June 1945, Folder 1242, Box 283, Entry 190, Research Group 226, NARA. **The SAARF teams carried letters printed in English and German. The letters asked readers to assist the SAARF team, and read in part "The Mission of this individual is in connection with Allied Prisoners of War in GERMANY. He comes to determine whether those who have such prisoners under restraint or control, are fulfilling their obligations under the Geneva Convention. In an emergency he is prepared to call for aid in obtaining food and medical supplies as required for their maintenance and well being and has facilities for establishing contact with Allied Agencies for that purpose."** H.R. Bull, "Special Authority of SAARF Teams," 12 April 1945, Folder 322, Box 38, Entry 1, Research Group 331, NARA.
- 68 SHAEF FWD to EXFOR MAIN, 20 May 1945, Folder Operation VICARAGE, Box 94, Entry 268, Research Group 331, NARA. **In the same file, see also MG H.R. Bull to Commander, SAARF (Main), "Disbandment of SAARF," 20 May 1945.**
- 69 "Orders" 29 May 1945, Skokoski collection, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.
- 70 **With the post-WWII drawdown, the U.S. deactivated all of its special operations units. This included the OSS, which President Harry S. Truman disbanded by Executive Order 9621 on 1 October 1945.**

OSS Operational Groups Branch Sidebar Endnotes

- 1 William J. Donovan, "Memorandum to the War Department: Sabotage Operations and Guerrilla Warfare," 11 May 1942, F 1464, B 140, E 136, RG 226, NARA.
- 2 Office of Strategic Services, "Operational Groups Field Manual," 25 April 1944, p. 14-15, scanned copy of the original found on-line at <http://www.soc.mil/OSS/assets/operational-groups-fm.pdf>, accessed 1 October 2014.
- 3 OG Operational Group Command, p. 5-6.
- 4 *Department of the Army Field Manual FM-31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*, October 1951 p. 39-40.
- 5 *Department of the Army Field Manual FM-31-21, Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*, October 1951 p. 43.
- 6 **The only WWII unit in the lineage of Special Forces is the combined U.S. and Canadian First Special Service Force. As an independent unit under the direction and supervision of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the OSS is not in the lineage of any Army entity even though its concepts and service influenced the organization and mission of Special Forces when it was created in 1952. As an example of the official lineage, see Department of the Army, Lineage and Honors, 1st Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces Regiment, found online at <http://www.history.army.mil/html/forstruc/lineages/branches/sf/001sfgrp1sf.htm>, accessed 26 September 2013.**
- 7 Alfred H. Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins* (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 35.

OSS Branch Operations in France Sidebar Endnotes

- 1 Kermit Roosevelt, *The Overseas Targets: War Report of the OSS Volume II* (Washington DC: Carrollton Press, 1976), 191.
- 2 Kermit Roosevelt, *The Overseas Targets*, 191.
- 3 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch (F-Section): West Europe, [May 1945?], p. 12, Roll 6, Target 4, Volume 3, Book II, M1623, National Archives and Records Administration.
- 4 Will Irwin, *The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France, 1944* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2005), 248-78.
- 5 Kermit Roosevelt, *The Overseas Targets*, 199.
- 6 *OSS London War Diary*, "Special Operations Branch: Army Staffs (1st and 2nd Qtrs)," [May 1945?], p. i-ii, Roll 9, Target 2, Volume 5, Book 1, M1623, National Archives and Records Administration.

The Heritage

From 1962 to 1980, *Veritas* was the “authorized unofficial newspaper” of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.¹ Produced for the Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs soldiers of the Center, the newspaper’s content ran the gamut from full-length features on operations and training exercises to the results of the latest Fort Bragg intramural sports contests, and who was selected as the Commanding General’s Orderly. Promotions, awards, retirements, and, invariably, a photo of the current Miss USA or the Playmate of the Month were all regular features. The Psychological Operations units at the Center printed the newspaper on their offset presses, and over the years the frequency of publication varied from bi-weekly to monthly.

Each issue of *Veritas* is a ‘snapshot-in-time’ and a rich source of historical information. The USASOC History Office has an extensive, but incomplete collection of the magazine. Notably absent are all the issues printed from 1962 to 1964. For the years from 1965 through 1970, there are a number of individual issues missing. The collection is substantially complete from 1971 to 1979. The enclosed table lists the missing issues. The History Office is soliciting copies of the missing issues of *Veritas* from our readers to complete our collection. The issues will be scanned in digital format and the originals returned to the owner. If you have copies of any of the original *Veritas* identified in the table and are willing to allow us to copy them, contact Mr. Earl Moniz (910) 908-4837, monize@soc.mil, or Mr. Alex Lujan (910) 908-0924, Alejandro.lujan@soc.mil. Thank You! ▲

Endnotes

Missing Issues:

1962 – All issues	1968 – Jul, Sep	1975 – Sep, Oct, Nov
1963 – All issues	1969 – Mar, Jun, Jul, Dec	1976 – Jan, Feb
1964 – All issues	1970 – Mar, Jul, Nov	1977 – May, Jun
1965 – Jan, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov	1971 – Apr, Jul, Aug, Sep	1978 – Jun, Jul, Aug
1966 – Feb, Apr, Oct, Dec	1972 – Aug, Sep, Dec	1980 – May, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec
	1973 – Mar, Sep	

1 *Veritas*, 12, No. 1, (January 1973), 3.



1963



1971



1969




1970




1970



1972



1975



1978



Commander, USASOC
ATTN: AOHS (Veritas)
E-2929 Desert Storm Drive
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

Future Veritas...

The next issue of Veritas will be another 'spectrum' issue covering multiple aspects of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) history. An article on the Combined-Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) will explain command and control of SOF elements in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) from 2001 to 2014. A timeline of ARSOF in Afghanistan will complement the CJSOTF-A article. Photographs and interviews capturing ARSOF contributions during OEF will support both pieces. A highlight of this issue will be an introduction to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), established in 1973 to resolve MIA cases in Southeast Asia.



U.S. Special Forces team members with Special Operations Task Force - South board two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters following a clearing operation in Panjwai District, 25 April 2011, in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.